The Problem of Evil (XXVII)

[wiploc]

Only if you define it that way.  Plantinga does.  He says god couldn't create a goodworld with free will, because his choosing to create that particular world (knowing, as he would in his omniscience, every choice everyone would ever make in that world) would deny the inhabitants free will.  

There are two problems with that.  

One (and I want you to pretty much ignore this one, let's not have a long digression about it) is that it makes free will worthless.  I like my free will as much as you like yours.  And if you tell me this world was created by an all-knowing god, and that therefore, according to Planting's perverse and self-serving definition, my will isn't technically free, that doesn't make me like it any less.  

The other objection is that Plantinga engaged in special pleading.  If god's knowing our decisions beforehand robs us of free will in a goodworld, then it will also do that in a badworld.  The logical result of Plantinga's logic is that tri-omni gods cannot create any world with free will.  

In which case, a goodworld without free will would be better than a badworld without free will.  

So a good god, if it existed, and if it was omniscient and omnipotent, would still have created a goodworld.  

I think Plantinga's argument was that God could not acutalize a world that had no suffering and free will because:

1. He does not consider it free will if God had to contintually intervened in event as to make a person choose good (strongly actualizing).

It's not, I believe, a matter of continually intervening.  There are possible worlds in which god never intervenes, and in which people always choose the good.  If that lack of post-creation intervention made our will free, then a good god would have created one of these.  Plantinga's claim is that, because god knew each choice we would make in these sinless worlds ("sinless" may be a sloppy shortcut term, but it's easier than inserting a paragraph of explanation each time I refer to them), and because god would have created that world while knowing what decisions we would make in it, then god, ultimately, would be the one making those decisions.  We would not, therefore, have morally significant free will.  

This doesn't change based on the number of times god intervenes.  If an omniscient god creates any sinless world, the choices made by the people in that world do not count

2. While it might be logically possible that God can "pre-plan" a possible world (weakly actualizing) with free will and the outcome of no one ever chosing evil, it is also possible that he cannot actualize a real world with such an outcome.

Not if words have meaning:  An omnipotent god can do anything that doesn't involve logical contradiction.  These worlds do not involve logical contradiction.  Therefore, god could do them.  

     a. It may be that in a particular "possible world" a person would choose good, but may very well choose evil in the actual world (he defined this as transworld depravity). 

Transworld depravity is where someone sins in world A, and also sins in world B.  The woman is a sinner in both worlds, so her depravity is transworld.  

     b. Will trillions+ of such interrelated possibilities, it is not apparent any longer that an actual world of free will and no evil is possible. 

But it is apparent.  A possible world is any world in which there is no logical contradiction.  There's no logical contradiction involved in people not choosing evil.  If there was such a contradiction, see, then we would have to choose evil, and we would therefore not have morally significant free will.  

So it has to be possible, or Planting's whole scheme becomes pointless.  And he admits that sinless worlds with free will are among the possible worlds.  He doesn't say they aren't possible; he says god couldn't create them without thereby cancelling our morally significant free will.   

But that argument applies equally to badworlds.  It's not like our free will would be cancelled in a goodworld but wouldn't be cancelled in a badworld.  To the extent that the argument works, it works equally well for goodworlds and badworlds.  

Your conclusion that given Plantinga's argument, God cannot create a world with any free will illustrates the problem with your definition of omnibenevolence and if it entails an obligation.

This is getting strange.  I've made it clear that I don't see god as obligated.  That is no part of my argument.  But you keep bringing it up.  You aren't baiting me; you aren't a troll.  So what's going on? 

Even weirder is the fact that we're discussing Plantinga's argument.  God's obligation is no part of Plantinga's argument, so how does the topic come up? 

Plantinga says that if an omnipotent god creates a world knowing what decisions we'll make in that world, then we don't have free will in that world.  (Admittedly, Plantinga only applies this argument to goodworlds, but the logic is the same for badworlds.  If it works for goodworlds, it must also work for badworlds.)  Omnibenevolence doesn't come into this argument at all, let alone my definition of omnibenevolence. 

As for my definition:  I define benevolence as wanting good.  When you suggested that knowing god is the greatest good, I defined benevolence as wanting people to know god.  When you suggested that free will and happiness are also good, I defined benevolence as wanting people to know god and to have free will and to be happy. 

So omnibenevolence, then, was simply a matter of wanting those things badly enough to act on this desire.  If a god wants those things, but is too busy playing Grand Theft Auto to actually do anything about it, then that god is not omnibenevolent. 

I've been flexible in my definitions.  You've never seen anybody change the definition of "good" (and, by implication, the definition of omnibenevolence) to accommodate your arguments more than I have.