The Problem of Evil (XXVII)

[LadyForCamus]

 

Evil is what an omnibenevolent god forsakes, not "other good attributes."  

That is the question isn't it?

 

The only thing logically incompatible with comfort is discomfort.  The only thing logically incompatible with happiness is unhappiness.  If we call comfort and happiness good, and discomfort and unhappiness evil, then--except for evil--an omnipotent god can have anything it wants in addition to comfort and happiness.  

If what it wants is discomfort and unhappiness, then it is not omnibenevolent.  
If it wants something else and can't have both that and the absence of evil, then it is not omnipotent.  

This is simple, but it's not naive or false: An omnipotent god can have anything it wants that isn't logically incompatible with other things it wants.  An omnibenevolent god doesn't want evil.  Therefore, an omnipotent and omnibenevolent god can have anything it wants.  

I don't believe that comfort and happiness equate with good (at least not on a logical or definitional level).   This it is more of an emotional problem, than logical.

The beauty and warmth of summer is upon us here in the eastern United States.  It's only the first week of June, and there have already been four toddler deaths as the result of being left, strapped into a car seat, in the back of a hot car for over 8 hours.  Maybe this sounds like an appeal to emotion but come on, now.  God isn't even TRYING at this point.  This type of senseless suffering (emotional as well as physical, because the child cannot grasp why he has been abandoned) is beyond comprehension.  How easy it should be for a tri-Omni God to step in and prevent such abject horror.

"Mysterious ways" doesn't cut it.

[SteveII]

Such a state of affairs would result in a singular lack of morally sufficient freedom --effectively eliminating free will.

Only if you define it that way.  Plantinga does.  He says god couldn't create a goodworld with free will, because his choosing to create that particular world (knowing, as he would in his omniscience, every choice everyone would ever make in that world) would deny the inhabitants free will.  

There are two problems with that.  

One (and I want you to pretty much ignore this one, let's not have a long digression about it) is that it makes free will worthless.  I like my free will as much as you like yours.  And if you tell me this world was created by an all-knowing god, and that therefore, according to Planting's perverse and self-serving definition, my will isn't technically free, that doesn't make me like it any less.  

The other objection is that Plantinga engaged in special pleading.  If god's knowing our decisions beforehand robs us of free will in a goodworld, then it will also do that in a badworld.  The logical result of Plantinga's logic is that tri-omni gods cannot create any world with free will.  

In which case, a goodworld without free will would be better than a badworld without free will.  

So a good god, if it existed, and if it was omniscient and omnipotent, would still have created a goodworld.  

I think Plantinga's argument was that God could not acutalize a world that had no suffering and free will because:

1. He does not consider it free will if God had to contintually intervened in event as to make a person choose good (strongly actualizing).
2. While it might be logically possible that God can "pre-plan" a possible world (weakly actualizing) with free will and the outcome of no one ever chosing evil, it is also possible that he cannot actualize a real world with such an outcome. 
     a. It may be that in a particular "possible world" a person would choose good, but may very well choose evil in the actual world (he defined this as transworld depravity). 
     b. Will trillions+ of such interrelated possibilities, it is not apparent any longer that an actual world of free will and no evil is possible. 

Your conclusion that given Plantinga's argument, God cannot create a world with any free will illustrates the problem with your definition of omnibenevolence and if it entails an obligation.

[wiploc]

People keep saying that God is the greatest conceivable being.  But I can conceive of a much greater being than the God of the Bible.  I don't know maybe one who doesn't drown people, or let children starve to death.  That's a good start.  In fact I'd say that the God of the bible is one of the worst villains in literature.  I mean he's going to throw billions into a lake of fire for not believing he exists.

Yes, a god who doesn't exist is far greater than the Christian god.

[wiploc]

Only if you define it that way.  Plantinga does.  He says god couldn't create a goodworld with free will, because his choosing to create that particular world (knowing, as he would in his omniscience, every choice everyone would ever make in that world) would deny the inhabitants free will.  

There are two problems with that.  

One (and I want you to pretty much ignore this one, let's not have a long digression about it) is that it makes free will worthless.  I like my free will as much as you like yours.  And if you tell me this world was created by an all-knowing god, and that therefore, according to Planting's perverse and self-serving definition, my will isn't technically free, that doesn't make me like it any less.  

The other objection is that Plantinga engaged in special pleading.  If god's knowing our decisions beforehand robs us of free will in a goodworld, then it will also do that in a badworld.  The logical result of Plantinga's logic is that tri-omni gods cannot create any world with free will.  

In which case, a goodworld without free will would be better than a badworld without free will.  

So a good god, if it existed, and if it was omniscient and omnipotent, would still have created a goodworld.  

I think Plantinga's argument was that God could not acutalize a world that had no suffering and free will because:

1. He does not consider it free will if God had to contintually intervened in event as to make a person choose good (strongly actualizing).

It's not, I believe, a matter of continually intervening.  There are possible worlds in which god never intervenes, and in which people always choose the good.  If that lack of post-creation intervention made our will free, then a good god would have created one of these.  Plantinga's claim is that, because god knew each choice we would make in these sinless worlds ("sinless" may be a sloppy shortcut term, but it's easier than inserting a paragraph of explanation each time I refer to them), and because god would have created that world while knowing what decisions we would make in it, then god, ultimately, would be the one making those decisions.  We would not, therefore, have morally significant free will.  

This doesn't change based on the number of times god intervenes.  If an omniscient god creates any sinless world, the choices made by the people in that world do not count

2. While it might be logically possible that God can "pre-plan" a possible world (weakly actualizing) with free will and the outcome of no one ever chosing evil, it is also possible that he cannot actualize a real world with such an outcome.

Not if words have meaning:  An omnipotent god can do anything that doesn't involve logical contradiction.  These worlds do not involve logical contradiction.  Therefore, god could do them.  

     a. It may be that in a particular "possible world" a person would choose good, but may very well choose evil in the actual world (he defined this as transworld depravity). 

Transworld depravity is where someone sins in world A, and also sins in world B.  The woman is a sinner in both worlds, so her depravity is transworld.  

     b. Will trillions+ of such interrelated possibilities, it is not apparent any longer that an actual world of free will and no evil is possible. 

But it is apparent.  A possible world is any world in which there is no logical contradiction.  There's no logical contradiction involved in people not choosing evil.  If there was such a contradiction, see, then we would have to choose evil, and we would therefore not have morally significant free will.  

So it has to be possible, or Planting's whole scheme becomes pointless.  And he admits that sinless worlds with free will are among the possible worlds.  He doesn't say they aren't possible; he says god couldn't create them without thereby cancelling our morally significant free will.   

But that argument applies equally to badworlds.  It's not like our free will would be cancelled in a goodworld but wouldn't be cancelled in a badworld.  To the extent that the argument works, it works equally well for goodworlds and badworlds.  

Your conclusion that given Plantinga's argument, God cannot create a world with any free will illustrates the problem with your definition of omnibenevolence and if it entails an obligation.

This is getting strange.  I've made it clear that I don't see god as obligated.  That is no part of my argument.  But you keep bringing it up.  You aren't baiting me; you aren't a troll.  So what's going on? 

Even weirder is the fact that we're discussing Plantinga's argument.  God's obligation is no part of Plantinga's argument, so how does the topic come up? 

Plantinga says that if an omnipotent god creates a world knowing what decisions we'll make in that world, then we don't have free will in that world.  (Admittedly, Plantinga only applies this argument to goodworlds, but the logic is the same for badworlds.  If it works for goodworlds, it must also work for badworlds.)  Omnibenevolence doesn't come into this argument at all, let alone my definition of omnibenevolence. 

As for my definition:  I define benevolence as wanting good.  When you suggested that knowing god is the greatest good, I defined benevolence as wanting people to know god.  When you suggested that free will and happiness are also good, I defined benevolence as wanting people to know god and to have free will and to be happy. 

So omnibenevolence, then, was simply a matter of wanting those things badly enough to act on this desire.  If a god wants those things, but is too busy playing Grand Theft Auto to actually do anything about it, then that god is not omnibenevolent. 

I've been flexible in my definitions.  You've never seen anybody change the definition of "good" (and, by implication, the definition of omnibenevolence) to accommodate your arguments more than I have. 

[SteveII]

@wiploc - did you see my post at the bottom of page 14. It would help me...

[wiploc]

@wiploc - did you see my post at the bottom of page 14. It would help me...

I will attend to it.

[wiploc]

Probability doesn't come into it.  It's all terminology and deductive logic.  An omnipotent god (one who can do anything except violate logic) can achieve any three goals that do not logically contradict each other.  Knowing a god, having free will, and being happy are not logically contradictory.  Therefore, an omnipotent god could do all three.  An omniscient god would know how to do all three.  An omnibenevolent god (assuming we define those three things as good) would choose to achieve all three.  Therefore, in any world in which these three things are not achieved, tri-omni gods do not exist.  

Feel free to show me where I injected statistics and probability into that.  




I deny and repudiate that argument.  By now you know that it is a misrepresentation.  I do not see gods as obligated in any way. 

Okay, so I am not clear on something. My amended understanding of your argument that you are making has three underlying assumptions: 

1. If God is omnipotent, then he can create any world he desires,

True.  

Well, it's not really true, but it's a good approximate short answer.  He can't create impossible worlds (with, say, square circles).  And he can't create worlds that aren't created by gods.  Those are possible worlds (I believe the actual world is one of them) that god can't create.  

Happy, free-willed worlds are among the possible worlds.  Many of these are god-created.  God could have actualized one of these. 

So, though this statement isn't quite technically true, it's pretty darned close.  

2. If God is omnibenevolent then he must actualize a world without suffering,

Say I like strawberry ice cream better than chocolate.  I always choose strawberry over chocolate.  Does that mean I must do so, or that I ought to do so?  No, I choose to do so.  

No ought.  No must.  

If god were omnibenevolent, he would have actualized a world without suffering. That would have been his preference, so that's what he would have done.  

and 
3. If God is omniscient then he would know how. 

My misunderstanding centers around 2. I think if your position is as I wrote it, it contradicts 1.

So we'll put them the other way around:

A strong enough god could make any world it wanted to make.  
A good enough god would want to make a world in which everyone is happy.  (Or in which everyone knows god, etc.)  
A god both strong enough and good enough would actually make a world in which everyone is happy.  

It wouldn't have to do this.  It wouldn't be obligated to do this.  But, if it desired good, then it would choose to do good.  

I then assumed (incorrectly) that then you were making the weaker claim (a probabilistic argument) that given the tri-omni properties we should see a world without suffering (you used phrases like "would choose").

Perhaps you're referring to the the subjunctive mood, describing conterfactual situations:  If a benevolent god existed, then it would choose good.  Because that's what benevolence is.

So, what exactly do you mean? Does omnibenevolence entail that God must choose no suffering (logical route)? Or are you okay with the weaker claim "should" choose no suffering (probabilistic route)?

Neither of those.  A benevolent god would choose no suffering.  It wouldn't have to, and it wouldn't necessarily be obligated to, but it would want to.  

As a meat-eating vegetarian is a contradiction in terms, so an benevolent go who prefers evil is a contradiction in terms. 

Vegetarians aren't required to avoid meat, and they aren't obligated to avoid meat.  They choose to avoid meat. 

If you eat meat, you aren't a vegetarian. 
If you choose evil, you aren't omnibenevolent. 

Does that help?

[Neo-Scholastic]

Lady for Camus, I believe this was our very first exchange on your thread called Scientific Knowledge verus spiritual knowledge: http://atheistforums.org/thread-40576-po...pid1161465
I did not call you stupid. I said you were ignorant, specifically with regards to the definition of knowledge as it has been understood in the field of philosophy since the time of Plato. Later I did call you stupid in response to you saying that theists were not welcome on AF: http://atheistforums.org/thread-40576-po...pid1161481 So yes, you are right I did call you stupid and ignorant. I overreacted. If I did not already do so, I apologize.

I do not say this in any way to excuse what I said. I am glad that you feel you have found a home on AF in the 6+ months you have been here. I hope you can understand why I reacted negatively. I have been contributing for about 4 years now so when you said theists are not welcome on AF, I took that as a sign of great disrespect, not just to me, but to AF as a whole. Since you joined, you seemed very hostile to the long-time theists on this board before taking the time to understand that we have history with some of the other members with whom we trade playful jabs. Occasionally, a long-time atheist member and I will have bitter disputes that include insults and vulgarities on both sides. The vigor of our debates does not mean that at the end of the day we don't still have a modicum of respect for one another.

[wiploc]

God wouldn't, apparently.

If you are saying that God hasn't done anything about the problem of Evil, this would be entirely incorrect.

The PoE isn't something you do something about.  It is simply a logical contradiction.  Some people believe in a god who,
1. Is able to prevent all evil,
2. knows how to prevent all evil,
3. chooses to prevent all evil, but who,
4. doesn't prevent all evil. 

That's a contradiction.  That is the PoE. 

Anyone who believes in a tri-omni god and also believes in evil is wrong.

[wiploc]

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Let's say that I wouldn't lift a finger. Would you make any effort to still find a way to consider me benevolent?

It depends on the reason why you did not.

Okay, let's make him omnipotent and omniscient, and he still doesn't lift a finger to prevent evil. 

Now is he benevolent?