The Problem of Evil (XXVII)

[SteveII]

Let's try it this way:

P1: An existing god, if omnibenevolent, would prevent all evil if it was able to.
P2: An existing god, if omnipotent, would be able to prevent all evil.
C1: Therefore, an omnibenevolent omnipotent god would prevent all evil.
C2: Therefore, if there were an omnipotent omnibenevolent god, there would be no evil.
C3: Therefore, if there is evil, there is no omnibenevolent omnipotent god.
C4: Therefore, anyone who believes in evil, and also believes in an omnibenevolent omnipotent god is wrong.

It's a proof.  Show me your defeaters. 

If I said "Two plus two is four," would you say, "That's only true if you deal with the defeaters"?

Defeater for P2

It is contingently impossible for God to actualize a world without evil because for every decision that a person made in the possible world, he could very well made a different one in the actual world (free will and all). Formally:

1. There are possible worlds that even an omnipotent being can not actualize.
2. A world with morally free creatures producing only moral good is such a world.

Contingently possible is a status of a proposition that is neither true in every possible situation nor false in every possible situation. Propositions that are contingent are so because they are connected to something else that together determine the truth value. An example: "I will be in Paris tomorrow if my plane arrives safely" Assuming I am on a plane bound for Paris, the truth of the proposition of me being in Paris tomorrow is contingent on my plane arriving safely.