The Problem of Evil (XXVII)

[wiploc]

Let's try it this way:

P1: An existing god, if omnibenevolent, would prevent all evil if it was able to.
P2: An existing god, if omnipotent, would be able to prevent all evil.
C1: Therefore, an omnibenevolent omnipotent god would prevent all evil.
C2: Therefore, if there were an omnipotent omnibenevolent god, there would be no evil.
C3: Therefore, if there is evil, there is no omnibenevolent omnipotent god.
C4: Therefore, anyone who believes in evil, and also believes in an omnibenevolent omnipotent god is wrong.

It's a proof.  Show me your defeaters. 

If I said "Two plus two is four," would you say, "That's only true if you deal with the defeaters"?

Defeater for P2

It is contingently impossible

I don't understand "contingently impossible."  Maybe you can help me out with a rephrase?  

You have more on contingent possibility below.  I'll say more there.

for God to actualize a world without evil because for every decision that a person made in the possible world, he could very well made a different one in the actual world (free will and all).

I don't understand.  Lets say there are two possible worlds:  In world A, George will skip breakfast.  In world B, George will eat ham and eggs.

Are you saying that if god decides to create world A, George may eat breakfast even though god created the world in which he does not eat breakfast? 

It's like the uncertainty principle? God only knows what will happen in a possible world so long as he doesn't create it?  If that's what you're saying, then your god isn't omniscient.  He doesn't know the actual future.  It's move number two:

Possible relevant responses to the PoE:
1. God isn't really that powerful.
2. God isn't really that knowing.
3. God isn't really that benevolent.
4. Evil doesn't really exist.
5. Logic sucks.  

If your point is that your god isn't really omniscient, then you aren't contradicting the PoE; you are agreeing with it.  

Formally:

1. There are possible worlds that even an omnipotent being can not actualize.

Technically, yes; but not relevantly yes.   That is, there are possible worlds that aren't created by a god.  But there's always going to be an identical one that is created by a god.  A god could create the one that is.  

2. A world with morally free creatures producing only moral good is such a world.

That's not a contradiction, so it is a possible world.  (It's actually an infinity of possible worlds.)  There is no reason an omnipotent god couldn't make such a world.  

If you want to say that god can't create a free-willed goodworld, I can say that god can't create a free-willed badworld.  In which case, I have used your own logic to prove there is no god in this, the actual, world.  

(I feel like I'm probably missing something here, failing to understand your argument.  So I should have shut up sooner, right?  But the sooner I shut up, the less likely you are to understand what it is that I don't understand, and the less likely you are to be able to explain where I went wrong.)

Contingently possible is a status of a proposition that is neither true in every possible situation nor false in every possible situation.

"Possible" means true in one or more possible worlds.  "Contingent" means not true in all possible worlds.  Contingently possible, then would mean true in more than zero but fewer than all worlds?  

Yes!  That's what you just wrote!  I got it!

Propositions that are contingent are so because they are connected to something else that together determine the truth value. An example: "I will be in Paris tomorrow if my plane arrives safely" Assuming I am on a plane bound for Paris, the truth of the proposition of me being in Paris tomorrow is contingent on my plane arriving safely.

Okay, so now I can go back to your original sentence with my new understanding, and see if it makes any sense to me now:

It is contingently impossible for God to actualize a world without evil because for every decision that a person made in the possible world, he could very well made a different one in the actual world (free will and all).

In world A, George skips his breakfast.  An omnipotent god would know he was going to do that.  So, if god created world A, George would skip his breakfast in the actual world because world A is the actual world because world A is the world that the god created. 

In a possible world that a god creates, for every decision that a person makes in that possible world, he makes the same decision in the actual world, because that possible world is the actual world. 

Therefore, it seems to me, your defeater is defeated. 

Sorry it took so long to work out what you were saying.