The Ontological Argument - valid or debunked?

[Angrboda]

@SteveII:
The argument assumes that a maximally great being would possess the property of necessarily existing.  If the greatness of a property is subjective, then it's not objectively true that a maximally great being would have the property of existing necessarily.  Premise 3 actually states that a maximally great being would exist necessarily.  Since it's not objectively true that maximal greatness includes necessarily existing, this premise is false, and the proof is unsound.  The only way around this objection is to show that necessarily existing is objectively great, and this you cannot do, for as explained the notion of objective greatness is incoherent.

I still have a problem with the claim that maximal greatness is subjective. We are not talking about the greatest being we can imagine. We are talking about the greatest being possible. Even if a complete picture of what that might mean is unclear, it does not matter.

What makes a specific property objectively great? If properties are objectively great or objectively bad, then you should be able to tell me what makes any specific property great or bad. But as I noted with Chad, properties do not form an ordered set from bad to good. You cannot rank any one property as being better or worse to possess except by subjective opinion. Therefore you can't rank necessarily existing as being better or worse than any other property aside from personal preference.

I mentioned this back a few pages: The difference is between epistemic possibility and metaphysical possibility. Epistemic possibility is simply "for all we know something is possible". On the other hand, to illustrate metaphysical possibility take a math equation 24673244/8=3005567. While we might say "for all we know" this might be true, but if it is true, than it is necessarily true if it is false than it is necessarily false. If a maximally great being exists, it exists necessarily in a metaphysical sense. Therefore, God’s existence is either possible or impossible.

Why? Because you think a maximally great being would have that property? You're still just tacking on 'exists necessarily' to a list of arbitrary attributes. A maximally great being is not like a mathematical equation except in the sense that it cannot be coherently and objectively defined, as some math equations are. 1/0=3 is simply undefined because you cannot divide by zero. It is neither true nor false, it is simply not defined to have a value. Simply asserting that a maximally great being must be metaphysically necessary is nothing more than you stating your preference that, if you were a great being, you would desire to be metaphysically necessary. And the question is why? What is it about existing necessarily that makes it desirable? Is it an objective feature of necessarily existing that makes it desirable?

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It's perhaps easier to show the problem with an analogous argument.

Premise 1: It's possible that a 'maximally beautiful being' exists.
Premise 2: If it's possible that a maximally beautiful being exists, then a maximally beautiful being exists in some possible world.
Premise 3: If a maximally beautiful being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
Premise 4: If a maximally beautiful being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
Premise 5: Therefore a maximally beautiful being exists in the actual world.
Premise 6: Therefore a maximally beautiful being exists.

We can see more clearly here that premise 3 is just an arbitrary assertion because it's clear in this case that beauty making properties are arbitrary preferences and do not compose an ordered set from ugly making to beauty making. Is necessarily existing a beautiful property to have? It's totally arbitrary, just as in the case of greatness.

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Regarding your objection to the parody, just as there are theodicies which explain evil in a world with a good God, there are theodicies for this. Suppose it is a greater evil if people commit evil acts of their own free will? Then a maximally evil being would maximize evil by creating a world full of creatures who have the possibility of doing good, but perform evil of their own free will.

Anyway, your objection to the maximally evil being lies outside the confines of the actual logical argument itself, so ultimately all one has to say is that "it's a mystery" why the maximally evil being has created the world in the fashion He has.