Free will

[The Grand Nudger]

The conditions are irrelevant. In an absurdist universe where there is no cause or condition..a true claim to foreknowledge is still true. In a fatalist universe where the only cause or condition is that outcomes are fatalistic, a true claim to foreknowledge is still true. In a closed loop of causal determinism, a true claim to foreknowledge is still true. This is a demand of the claim regardless of the circumstances which led to it, even if there -are- no circumstances which led to it...which is why discussing those circumstances is an irrelevancy with regards to the claims being considered for compatibility.

I don't think you realize the import of your statements. If the conditions producing an outcome are irrelevant to true foreknowledge of the outcome, then any conditions are possible, and no conditions can be ruled out. Thus, free will as the condition that produces the outcome cannot be ruled out, but you have been claiming throughout this entire thread that free will must necessarily be ruled out.

There -are- no conditions in an absurdist universe. It's not an issue of possibility. That;s one of the things that distinguishes absurdist universes from fatalistic universes, deterministic universes, or "other" in context. In a fatalistic universe, similarly, there is no condition -for such and such being true-, such and such is true because such and such is fated. Deterministic universes have conditions, they are defined by them...but in a deterministic universe we have no free will regardless of our possession of choices, or options.

My comments concern what is true regardless in -any- of these types of universes (whichever ours may be). Your response only speaks to the one type of universe in which free will is false by default, a universe of conditions for such and such, a deterministic universe. I don;t doubt that our choices form the conditions for some event "x" - I wonder in what way they can be said to be free, and of what.

If this all sounds familiar, that's because it's a restatement of the post -you quoted- in response. Making me wonder whether or not you had any free will in responding the way you did? Could you have "freely willed" otherwise, or was your choice to object, and object in such a manner, a consequence of conditions beyond your ability to influence?

For my part, I can accept and communicate to others that I am personally, unable to influence my choice of a hard determinists universe. It wouldn't even matter if I -wanted- to believe otherwise (which I do, it would be much more comforting), I can't. I must "choose A"...and not only that, I must object to B, and I must do so in the manner that I have done.

I don't think that there's a quantitative difference between "me" and other computational architectures, and I don;t even have a choice in that, let alone a free will choice. While I can appreciate that some or all of this may sound counter-intuitive to you (and hey...me too!), I can only state, before you ask... that our intuitions - whatever they may be and however they may be arrived at - appear to be in the business of producing -useful- conclusions, their accuracy being an entirely separate issue.