RE: The Ontological Argument - valid or debunked?
June 27, 2016 at 8:42 am
(This post was last modified: June 27, 2016 at 1:02 pm by Edwardo Piet.)
1. The maximally great being is defined in such a way that if he is possible in at least one possible world world then he is by definition necessarily possible in all possible worlds.
2. The maximally great being is possible in at least one possible world.
3. Our world is a possible world simply because it isn't an impossible world.
4. Therefore the maximally great being exists in our world.
That's how I would describe the argument. Here's my critique of it.
1. The maximally great being is merely logically possible.
2. When something is merely logically possible that just means it isn't self-contradictory.
3. When something is merely not self-contradictory that gives you no reason to believe it is actually possible: it merely means there is no proof it is impossible.
4. Therefore there is still no reason to believe that the maximally great being is actually possible in any world at all.
5. Therefore there is still no reason to believe that the maximally great being actually exists.
So it is clear to me that it's equivocating "logically possible in a possible world" with "actually possible in a possible world". The equivocation fallacy within the argument was very implicit and hidden and I have tried to explicate its implicitly many times now... hopefully this time I have succeeded
2. The maximally great being is possible in at least one possible world.
3. Our world is a possible world simply because it isn't an impossible world.
4. Therefore the maximally great being exists in our world.
That's how I would describe the argument. Here's my critique of it.
1. The maximally great being is merely logically possible.
2. When something is merely logically possible that just means it isn't self-contradictory.
3. When something is merely not self-contradictory that gives you no reason to believe it is actually possible: it merely means there is no proof it is impossible.
4. Therefore there is still no reason to believe that the maximally great being is actually possible in any world at all.
5. Therefore there is still no reason to believe that the maximally great being actually exists.
So it is clear to me that it's equivocating "logically possible in a possible world" with "actually possible in a possible world". The equivocation fallacy within the argument was very implicit and hidden and I have tried to explicate its implicitly many times now... hopefully this time I have succeeded
