So much of the 'debate' is semantics, once you replace the labels with the concepts in conversation it turns out compatibilist and icompatibilist largely agree. Instead of saying "free will" talk about "The ability to deliberate prior to action" or "the ability to deliberate acausally" and the issues tend to get resolved pretty easily.
As much as I like Dennet I can't help but think that he wastes too much time fighting over definitions of "free will" and "determinism" rather than just getting to the point and presenting a theory of 'intentional action' and whether or not it is fully caused and/or fully part of nature.
I'm of the opinion that what people consider to be "free will" is simply "what a algorithm feels like from the inside" to quote Yudkowski, it's what it feels like for our brains to be deliberating, gathering our memories, beliefs, desires and emotions and assessing possible futures that we believe will happen by acting in particular ways, then seeing what one of those we believe at the time is most in line with our desires.
As much as I like Dennet I can't help but think that he wastes too much time fighting over definitions of "free will" and "determinism" rather than just getting to the point and presenting a theory of 'intentional action' and whether or not it is fully caused and/or fully part of nature.
I'm of the opinion that what people consider to be "free will" is simply "what a algorithm feels like from the inside" to quote Yudkowski, it's what it feels like for our brains to be deliberating, gathering our memories, beliefs, desires and emotions and assessing possible futures that we believe will happen by acting in particular ways, then seeing what one of those we believe at the time is most in line with our desires.
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