RE: Existence as a real predicate
August 29, 2016 at 3:54 pm
(This post was last modified: August 29, 2016 at 4:10 pm by TheMuslim.)
Thanks for the welcome, Mister Agenda.
So Kant was wrong.
Mulla Sadra had refuted Kant, and had proved that existence is indeed a real predicate.
In other words, when I say "the lamp is bright," this statement doesn't necessarily imply that this "lamp" exists and that I am predicating brightness to it. In reality, the word "lamp" simply refers to a concept/ipseity/set-of-quiddities, and then I can predicate stuff to it - such as predicating existence. When I say "the lamp exists," I am not speaking of a real-world object which happens to exist (this would be redundant); I am in fact speaking of a set of quiddities, and then I predicate existence to these set of quiddities.
So any object that we may think of does not necessarily have "existence" as an essential component of it. It can only be considered existent if I specifically predicate existence to it. So whether its me, you, Jesus, Dawkins, a cat, a dog, the progenote, a horse, a dragon, or a unicorn, none of these things have existence in their very essence/definition. None of these things can be considered a "Necessary Being," i.e. something which has existence in its very essence. When spoken of, they are all simply concepts/sets-of-quiddities-ipseities. When we gain knowledge that these sets-of-quiddities indeed exist in the real world, we then predicate "existence" to them. (e.g. "Progenotes may or may not have existed," but when we discover that progenotes indeed existed, we then say "progenotes existed". Similarly, "Richard Dawkins may or may not exist," but when we discover that Richard Dawkins indeed exists, we say "Richard Dawkins exists.").
This also means that Kant's objection to the possibility of a "Necessary Existent" was refuted by Mulla Sadra. Accepting existence as a real predicate means that the concept of necessary existence is, indeed, meaningful.
So Kant was wrong.
Mulla Sadra had refuted Kant, and had proved that existence is indeed a real predicate.
In other words, when I say "the lamp is bright," this statement doesn't necessarily imply that this "lamp" exists and that I am predicating brightness to it. In reality, the word "lamp" simply refers to a concept/ipseity/set-of-quiddities, and then I can predicate stuff to it - such as predicating existence. When I say "the lamp exists," I am not speaking of a real-world object which happens to exist (this would be redundant); I am in fact speaking of a set of quiddities, and then I predicate existence to these set of quiddities.
So any object that we may think of does not necessarily have "existence" as an essential component of it. It can only be considered existent if I specifically predicate existence to it. So whether its me, you, Jesus, Dawkins, a cat, a dog, the progenote, a horse, a dragon, or a unicorn, none of these things have existence in their very essence/definition. None of these things can be considered a "Necessary Being," i.e. something which has existence in its very essence. When spoken of, they are all simply concepts/sets-of-quiddities-ipseities. When we gain knowledge that these sets-of-quiddities indeed exist in the real world, we then predicate "existence" to them. (e.g. "Progenotes may or may not have existed," but when we discover that progenotes indeed existed, we then say "progenotes existed". Similarly, "Richard Dawkins may or may not exist," but when we discover that Richard Dawkins indeed exists, we say "Richard Dawkins exists.").
This also means that Kant's objection to the possibility of a "Necessary Existent" was refuted by Mulla Sadra. Accepting existence as a real predicate means that the concept of necessary existence is, indeed, meaningful.
