RE: Existence as a real predicate
August 29, 2016 at 7:48 pm
(This post was last modified: August 29, 2016 at 7:50 pm by TheMuslim.)
(August 29, 2016 at 5:44 pm)quip Wrote:(August 29, 2016 at 12:49 am)TheMuslim Wrote: "Existence is a real predicate for Mulla Sadra since it is a property of an essence that is found in extra-mental realityProvide evidence of essence and we may proceed from there. (Essence exists?!)
I don't think he's asserting the existence of anything in particular. In the argument I posted, Mulla Sadra is simply analyzing the semantics of intellectual conversations.
By "essence" he simply means the "definition" of something. According to the dictionary, "essence" means: the basic nature of a thing: the quality or qualities that make a thing what it is.
Sadra argues that when we speak of subjects, the subject does not necessarily have "existence" in its very definition. As demonstrated in his argument, existential propositions are not analytic. When we speak of things, we speak of the concepts or definitions or "set-of-quiddities" or the "ipseity" of those things, and then if we find these concepts/sets-of-quiddities to be existent, we predicate existence to them. In other words, just as Kant argued that existence is not a real predicate, Sadra argued that existence is a real predicate. Kant argued that predicating existence is not meaningful, but Sadra argued that not predicating existence is not meaningful.
Sadra's justification seems more harmonious with natural semantics and makes more sense to me than Kant's. With this thread, I was hoping to see what other philosophers might think about this; is existence a real predicate, or not? Is it really not meaningful to not treat existence as a predicate, as Sadra argued?