What are the Characteristics of a NT Christian?

[SteveII]

So no free will in heaven as long as you stay within God's effective radius. And you turn out to be a literalist. God is omnipresent and located in heaven. God is a spirit and likes to sit in a chair. Good thing you believe he can only do the 'actually possible' or who knows what sleight of reality you'd have him doing.

Your definition of omnipresent is off. The idea is that God is aware of all points in the physical universe--not that he is in them. I posted this awhile back:

Before you go saying that God is everywhere, that is not going to hold up. The universe is expanding. If God was everywhere, is God expanding? Or perhaps becoming diluted? Additionally, the universe if finite. Does that mean that God is finite. More silly conclusion can be drawn from a too-simplistic view: for example, is a portion of God in my coffee cup and the rest of him outside of it? No, God does not occupy space and is therefore not literally everywhere. I believe he is cognizant of and causally active at every point in space.

Additionally, the verses are clearly describing a new reality (read the whole chapter), so any imagined conflict with this reality is just that, imagined.

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Broadly logically possible: Through logic alone, it is possible. Logic alone does not preclude it from being true. 
Actually possible: Can it actually exist in some possible world.

They're the same thing, Steve. What you mean to say is that the distinction is between "logically possible without context" and "logically possible given a certain context". [1]

I am claiming that the premise: "It is logically possible for God to create a world where everyone always chooses good" is broadly logically possible. However, because it is a contingent proposition (on free will), it seems like it is not actually possible. In other words, there is a factor in addition to logic that might make it impossible.

What is this necessary factor that makes this impossible in any possible world? Assuming that libertarian free will is logical: if you possess libertarian free will, then you should be free to choose good all the time, and this should apply to all human beings possessing this free will. Therefore, this should be the case in at least one possible world, unless there is a necessary factor that I am unaware of that prevents such a world from being possible. But you can't just argue it's unintuitive. Human intuition is often useless when arguing metaphysics and such. That's why we have logic.

And it's not just me saying this is "actually possible". The author(s) from the link I provided above (who clearly seem to be academic and well-versed in philosophy) agree that there is a possible world in which humans can choose good all the time [2], and they refer to the story of Adam and Eve to make their point. The page is dead now for some reason, but when it's back online, go there and scroll to the part where the author(s) discuss Plantinga's W4.

1. No, they are not--and you explained why they are not. If you are going to critique and discuss logically arguments, you have to understand the terms.

2. That is what I have been saying. I don't disagree with this statement.  However, that does not mean what you think it means. "Possible world" just means broadly logically possible. But the proposition is only contingently true (see link below for def). The PoE argument needs the proposition to be necessarily true (also see link for def) to succeed. 

http://www.manyworldsoflogic.com/modallogic.html

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3. We need to tighten up the definitions/positions for discussion purposes (these taken from the first sentence of each of the articles from Wikipedia):

Physicalism is the ontological thesis that "everything is physical", that there is "nothing over and above" the physical, or that everything supervenes on the physical.
Determinism is the philosophical position that for every event there exist conditions that could cause no other event.
Compatibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism. 
Dualism or duality is the position that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical, or that the mind and body are not identical. 

I am a non-physicalist, non-deterministic, dualist-interactionist. And as such I believe that the immaterial mind has actual free will to make real choices not always influenced by some prior cause.

Then it's sometimes by chance alone, so when this is the case, it's not really a choice. So we go back to the logically incoherent definition I provided earlier, and so wonder how you can even think that this is a logical concept. The free will you speak of makes no logical sense.

Tell me precisely where this definition is logically incoherent so I can figure out where the disconnect is:

Definition of Free Will: A personal explanation of some basic result R brought about intentionally be person P where this bringing about of R is a basic action A will cite the intention I of P that R occurred and the basic power B that P exercised to bring about R. P, I and B provide a personal explanation of R: agent P brought about R be exercising power B in order to realize intention I as an irreducible teleological goal. (Moreland, Blackwell's Companion to Natural Theology. p 298)