What are the Characteristics of a NT Christian?

[GrandizerII]

1. No, they are not--and you explained why they are not. If you are going to critique and discuss logically arguments, you have to understand the terms.

There is no meaningful distinction between "logically possible" and "actually possible", no matter how many times you try to argue against this.

2. That is what I have been saying. I don't disagree with this statement.  However, that does not mean what you think it means.

Ok, Mr. Psychic, you tell me what I think it means then.

"Possible world" just means broadly logically possible.

Not just broadly, no. A possible world is a world that's logically possible but not necessarily actualized. Therefore, there is at least a possible world where all humans freely choose to do good all the time, unless there is a necessary factor that prevents such a world from being a possible world. The question is, what the hell is that factor? You haven't bothered to address this in all your red herrings.

But the proposition is only contingently true (see link below for def). The PoE argument needs the proposition to be necessarily true (also see link for def) to succeed. 

http://www.manyworldsoflogic.com/modallogic.html

Steve, you must be confused.

The proposition "all humans freely choose good all the time" is contingently false according to the link you provided. But what this means therefore is there is at least one possible world in which this is indeed the case (that all humans freely choose good all the time). We don't need all possible worlds to correspond with the proposition. Only one possible world is needed for the objection containing this proposition to work.

From the link you provided:

Contingent falsity. A proposition is contingently false if it is false and in addition there are possible circumstances in which it would be true.

Tell me precisely where this definition is logically incoherent so I can figure out where the disconnect is:

Definition of Free Will: A personal explanation of some basic result R brought about intentionally be person P where this bringing about of R is a basic action A will cite the intention I of P that R occurred and the basic power B that P exercised to bring about R. P, I and B provide a personal explanation of R: agent P brought about R be exercising power B in order to realize intention I as an irreducible teleological goal. (Moreland, Blackwell's Companion to Natural Theology. p 298)

There is no disconnect that I can see here, but this seems to fit well with compatibilism and if it's meant to be describing libertarian free will, it doesn't seem to provide a sufficient description.

The disconnect, if you need one, is in the elaboration you provided in this quote below:

I am a non-physicalist, non-deterministic, dualist-interactionist. And as such I believe that the immaterial mind has actual free will to make real choices not always influenced by some prior cause.

I already explained what's wrong with this description in my previous response.