(April 27, 2017 at 11:52 am)Grandizer Wrote:Quote:Tell me precisely where this definition is logically incoherent so I can figure out where the disconnect is:
Definition of Free Will: A personal explanation of some basic result R brought about intentionally be person P where this bringing about of R is a basic action A will cite the intention I of P that R occurred and the basic power B that P exercised to bring about R. P, I and B provide a personal explanation of R: agent P brought about R be exercising power B in order to realize intention I as an irreducible teleological goal. (Moreland, Blackwell's Companion to Natural Theology. p 298)
There is no disconnect that I can see here, but this seems to fit well with compatibilism and if it's meant to be describing libertarian free will, it doesn't seem to provide a sufficient description.
The disconnect, if you need one, is in the elaboration you provided in this quote below:
Quote:I am a non-physicalist, non-deterministic, dualist-interactionist. And as such I believe that the immaterial mind has actual free will to make real choices not always influenced by some prior cause.
I already explained what's wrong with this description in my previous response.
Then it seems you are asserting that only physical brain states are responsible for decisions. The only support I know for that conclusion is to presuppose naturalism (it can be no other way). If that is your reasoning, it is question begging. Is there another reason to believe that that is all that is happening?
