Anslem's argument is sound.

[SteveII]

As I pointed out in the other thread, you are changing the term 'greatest' to 'good and bad' so you can use it in a moral sense (and declare it incoherent) when GCB Theology uses it in a qualitative sense. It is greater to be omnipotent than not. It is greater to be omniscient than not. It is greater to be morally perfect than not.

No, I am not.  This is a misinterpretation of my argument.  If you had pointed out your misunderstanding of my argument in the other thread, I did not see it.  Regardless, I mean the terms good and bad to apply in a qualitative sense, and nothing in my argument turns on interpreting them in the moral sense in order to declare them incoherent.  That last bit appears to be solely the product of your own imagination.  As I pointed out in that thread, the term 'greater' in the sense of "better than" is a wholly subjective assessment.  Objective reality does not have any "better than" relationships; things just are or are not.

Since we were discussing whether or not being morally perfect is "better than" being morally imperfect, I will continue with that alleged great-making quality.

In order to exhibit virtue, one must be tempted to do wrong, and instead choose to do good.  That is a necessary part of being virtuous.  As you claim in the other thread, a morally perfect God can do no wrong.  Moreover, since he's omniscient, he knows that he can and will do no wrong, so he is never tempted by the option of doing wrong.  In other words, God is constitutionally incapable of being virtuous.  (Also, he's incapable of knowing what the experience of being virtuous feels like, as the best he can muster is the sort of vicarious experience such as a parent may feel at watching their son score a touchdown.  He doesn't actually know the experience of it.  So this by itself means that God is not omniscient.  But that's a subject for another day....)  So God cannot be virtuous.  Suppose I value the experience of being virtuous, made possible by my moral imperfection, over whatever advantages being morally perfect may offer?  Do you have any objective grounds why I should not want a life of virtue over a life without this experience?  No, you cannot.  The best you can say is that you consider being morally perfect better than the ability to live virtuously.  But that's just your subjective assessment of the relative desirability of the two options.  Desires or preferences for one thing over another are always subjective, and so can't form the basis for a greatest conceivable being, because all you mean by that phrase is whatever some subjective assessment considers the most desirable.  Desires aren't objective facts.  Only objective facts can ground a 'greatest' conceivable being, and there are no objective facts pertaining to what is or is not greatest.

As I noted in the other thread, objective reality cares not one whit whether you are morally perfect or not.  You may say that according to your assessment, moral perfection is more desirable than moral imperfection.  But your desires are not binding upon reality.  I can come along and say that I prefer moral imperfection to moral imperfection, and the best you can say is that you feel otherwise.  Your preference for moral perfection is not an objective fact.

Let's examine the word 'better' to see why this is.  Merriam-Webster defines better as:


1 :greater than half - for the better part of an hour
2 :improved in health or mental attitude - feeling better
3 :more attractive, favorable, or commendable - in better circumstances
4 :more advantageous or effective - a better solution
5 :improved in accuracy or performance - building a better engine


The relative senses of the word are numbers 3, 4, and 5.  Number 3 is clearly pertaining to matters of subjective assessment, so it is unproblematic to dispense with that as a potential objective ground for ranking one thing over another thing.  Number 4 seems superficially to offer the potential for objectively grounding such relationships, but this is an illusion.  Something is more advantageous or effective for a given purpose or goal.  A screwdriver is more advantageous than a hammer for screwing in screws, but a hammer is more effective at pounding in nails.  Which one is "better than" the other depends upon what I want to achieve with it.  The choice of what I want to do with it is purely a personal, subjective decision.  I may choose to hammer in nails rather than screwing in screws, and there is no objective basis for saying that my choice is right or wrong.  It simply is 'my choice'.  So as we can see, the meaning of better is subjective, through and through.  A greatest conceivable being must be objectively great, but there is no such creature to be found in "better than" relationships; only subjective assessments and personal choices.  There is no objective ground upon which to base the judgement that any one thing is "better than" another thing.  All you've got is subjectivity.

You think "greater" is subjective because you are confusing the fact that God is the greatest concievable being with our descerning what properties a GCB must possess. These are not the same thing and the former does not depend on the latter. A debate about what properties are great-making does not imply that there is no objective truth about the matter. In his debates and Q&As, WLC uses the example of Timelessness. Is it greater to be timeless or in time? That is not clear to us. But that does not imply that there are no great-making properties or that the concept of a CGB is subjective. 

It could be the case that some properties are not great-making on their own, but are a result of or linked to or limited by some other property. For example, omniscience does not entail knowing all things because there are some propositions not possible to know (like knowing what virtuous feel like). A limit imposed by a superseding great-making property. So, it makes no sense to ask is it greater to have experienced virtue than not--because it is not a logical possibility. 

'Conceivable' is metaphysically the same as 'possible'. Not 'imaginable'. 

For the above reasons, God would have objectively great-making properties regardless of our ability to discern them. In fact, only God is capable of conceiving the complete set of great-making properties.  They would still apply if we existed or not, so to hang coherence on whether we can conceive of them just does not make sense.