Anslem's argument is sound.

[Angrboda]

You think "greater" is subjective because you are confusing the fact that God is the greatest concievable being with our descerning what properties a GCB must possess. These are not the same thing and the former does not depend on the latter.

Since this is not what I think, all this shows is that you haven't understood my argument. Your general complaint here seems to be that I am confusing our imperfect knowledge of the facts of the matter with the belief that this entails that there is no fact of the matter. But this is completely wrongheaded. My argument does not hinge upon what we don't know but rather hinges upon what we do know, namely that there are no objective values. Without any values by which we can rank one thing as objectively greater than another, the concept of greatness becomes vacuous. It's not that we have an imperfect understanding of what constitutes greatness, the problem is that we have perfect knowledge of what it does mean, objectively it doesn't mean anything. It isn't that we are confused about what the term 'greatest conceivable being' refers to -- we know what it refers to because it doesn't refer to anything at all.

A debate about what properties are great-making does not imply that there is no objective truth about the matter. In his debates and Q&As, WLC uses the example of Timelessness. Is it greater to be timeless or in time? That is not clear to us. But that does not imply that there are no great-making properties or that the concept of a CGB is subjective. 

You're right. A debate about what properties are great-making does not imply that there is no objective truth about the matter. It's the fact that there are no objective values which implies that there is no objective truth about the matter. This is simply an example of ignoratio elenchi on your part.

It could be the case that some properties are not great-making on their own, but are a result of or linked to or limited by some other property. For example, omniscience does not entail knowing all things because there are some propositions not possible to know (like knowing what virtuous feel like). A limit imposed by a superseding great-making property. So, it makes no sense to ask is it greater to have experienced virtue than not--because it is not a logical possibility.

What on earth are you babbling about? Of course experiencing virtue is a logical possibility. What you seem to be trying to say is that it is not possible to be all good and to also experience virtue. I agree. That was the whole point in introducing the subject, namely that the greatest possible being could be all good, or experience virtue. It was brought up to show that there may be aspects to being morally imperfect which are preferable to the advantages of being morally perfect. The choice between the two is purely a matter of personal preference, thus undermining your claim that being morally perfect was necessarily better than being morally imperfect. It was simply an example to show that you haven't in any sense demonstrated that being morally perfect is greater than being morally imperfect. Objective facts cannot settle that question as it is purely a matter of preference. Regardless, my point was simply to show that depending on what one subjectively values, your claim was not necessarily true. As a matter of necessity, moral perfection is not greater than moral imperfection because the term 'great' is not an objective descriptor. Your claim is false, ultimately, because objective values do not exist.

'Conceivable' is metaphysically the same as 'possible'. Not 'imaginable'. 

I don't even know what the phrase "metaphysically the same as 'possible'" even means. Conceiving is "metaphysically the same" as conceiving. I can conceive of a unicorn. In no sense is that the same as saying unicorns are possible, metaphysically or otherwise. There are subtle differences between conceivability and imaginability, but that has nothing to do with this absurd claim. I can only guess that this is some inchoate abbreviation of an objection you failed to bring to full fruition. As such, it means nothing by itself.

For the above reasons, God would have objectively great-making properties regardless of our ability to discern them. In fact, only God is capable of conceiving the complete set of great-making properties.  They would still apply if we existed or not, so to hang coherence on whether we can conceive of them just does not make sense.

Since I haven't hung the claim that there is no such thing as a greatest conceivable being on our ability to discern just what properties are great making, this objection is irrelevant and further proof that you haven't understood the argument. The phrase 'greatest conceivable being' does not refer to anything at all, not because of what we can't discern, but rather because of what we can discern, namely that there are no objective values. Without values by which to express a preference for one thing over another, there can be no preferences. It's not a matter of us not knowing exactly what the phrase refers to, but rather a consequence of knowing exactly what it refers to: it doesn't refer to anything at all. It's a meaningless, nonsense term.