Anslem's argument is sound.

[Angrboda]

"It's not a question of where he grips it, it's a simple question of weight ratios...."

Since this is not what I think, all this shows is that you haven't understood my argument.  Your general complaint here seems to be that I am confusing our imperfect knowledge of the facts of the matter with the belief that this entails that there is no fact of the matter.  But this is completely wrongheaded.  My argument does not hinge upon what we don't know but rather hinges upon what we do know, namely that there are no objective values.  Without any values by which we can rank one thing as objectively greater than another, the concept of greatness becomes vacuous.  It's not that we have an imperfect understanding of what constitutes greatness, the problem is that we have perfect knowledge of what it does mean, objectively it doesn't mean anything.  It isn't that we are confused about what the term 'greatest conceivable being' refers to -- we know what it refers to because it doesn't refer to anything at all.


You're right.  A debate about what properties are great-making does not imply that there is no objective truth about the matter.  It's the fact that there are no objective values which implies that there is no objective truth about the matter.  This is simply an example of ignoratio elenchi on your part.

An omniscient mind could certainly rank value of a property or ability on a better-than scale because it could consider all logically possible scenarios at once. Therefore maximal greatness can be know by an omniscient mind and therefore 'value' is not subjective.

It's a simple matter, Steve.  Either values are subjective, or they are objective.  According to traditional theist assertions, the universe itself doesn't contain any objective values.  Therefore any values you do find must be subjective.  This notion that with enough knowledge the values would somehow magically appear is incoherent.  It's like trying to assert that there is a "best" flavor of ice cream.  It's not a question of how much knowledge we have about ice cream and potential ice cream eaters.  Knowledge alone can't overcome the basic problem that there simply is no fact of the matter.  Surely the aardvark will say that ant-flavored ice cream is the best, and the lion will swear that it's gazelle-flavored ice cream that's the best.  But these opinions are clearly nothing more than the product of their natures.  If God has a favorite ice cream flavor, it too will be an arbitrary artifact of his nature.  No amount of knowledge on his part will create an objective criterion for evaluating ice cream where none actually exists.  If your God has a preference for one thing or another, that's simply him asserting his subjective values in the matter.  His values are not in any sense privileged over mine.  Knowledge doesn't translate into values, no matter how many times you repeat the argument. 

What on earth are you babbling about?  Of course experiencing virtue is a logical possibility.  What you seem to be trying to say is that it is not possible to be all good and to also experience virtue.  I agree.  That was the whole point in introducing the subject, namely that the greatest possible being could be all good, or experience virtue.  It was brought up to show that there may be aspects to being morally imperfect which are preferable to the advantages of being morally perfect.  The choice between the two is purely a matter of personal preference, thus undermining your claim that being morally perfect was necessarily better than being morally imperfect.  It was simply an example to show that you haven't in any sense demonstrated that being morally perfect is greater than being morally imperfect.  Objective facts cannot settle that question as it is purely a matter of preference. Regardless, my point was simply to show that depending on what one subjectively values, your claim was not necessarily true.  As a matter of necessity, moral perfection is not greater than moral imperfection because the term 'great' is not an objective descriptor.  Your claim is false, ultimately, because objective values do not exist.

You understood what I was saying perfectly.

No, Steve, I still don't understand what you're trying to say.  You remarked that being morally perfect and experiencing virtue preclude one another.  And......  And what?  No point that I could see followed from that observation.

Let's go back to what you said.  First, there was, "For example, omniscience does not entail knowing all things because there are some propositions not possible to know (like knowing what virtuous feel like)."  This seems to be an arbitrary and flawed assertion.  God, being morally perfect, cannot know what virtue feels like because his knowledge is limited, not because of any impossibility in knowing what virtue feels like.  He doesn't know simply because he doesn't know.  Possibility has nothing to do with it.  Then you followed with, "A limit imposed by a superseding great-making property."  That's not even a complete sentence, so I have no clue what you were trying to express with it.  (With the value of hindsight I can see that you were trying to sneak in an arbitrary value by using the word 'superseding'. Since you haven't justified calling it a superseding property, at best this is just a bare assertion.) And then you said, "So, it makes no sense to ask is it greater to have experienced virtue than not--because it is not a logical possibility."  Which doesn't seem to follow from anything said prior.

Again, an omniscient mind would be able to assess a better-than value."

Subjectively, sure.  Objectively, no.  Being omniscient doesn't create values where none exist.  Since better-than assessments require values to derive them, no such assessments can be objectively made without objective values.  Failing that, the idea of "better-than" is simply undefined.

I think is perfectly clear even to a mortal mind, that being morally perfect is better than, in the aggregate, being morally imperfect because there are far reaching consequences to being imperfect that more than outweigh the occasional advantage.

Again with the ipse dixit arguments!  Are you so used to simply asserting your truths that you've completely forgotten how to rationally justify something?

Moral perfection is an all or nothing property so therefore an aggregate assessment is the only possible one.

Aggregate or not, the only way to express a preference for moral perfection is by asserting values.  But you're precluded from doing so by the complete absence of relevant values.  And as long as we're on the subject of moral perfection I will simply say that I think the whole concept of moral perfection or imperfection rests implicitly on a category error.  I don't believe there is such a thing as having a moral or immoral "nature."  As pointed out in the last thread, the whole concept rests on the dubious notion that persons or beings can be intrinsically good or bad.  As a general matter, the moral concepts of good and bad apply to actions, not one's nature.  We figuratively say that Hitler was evil, but only because of the immoral acts he performed, not because of any supposed character defects.  This notion that people have intrinsic moral natures leads to seemingly paradoxical results.  According to it, it's possible that a person who never commits a single immoral act could still nevertheless be considered a "bad person."  I think that most people would find that usage queer, if not downright nonsensical.  Yet it is the conclusion your notions of intrinsic moral character lead us toward.  Personally, I think it's bollocks.  Morals apply to actions, not to "being."