Anslem's argument is sound.

[Edwardo Piet]

The fact the greatest conceivable being by definition is conceivable just proves that the imagination exists, it doesn't prove that the greatest conceivable being exists. The only way it could possibly prove that the greatest conceivable being exists is if the greatest conceivable being is imaginary. Ergo, the final conclusion that the greatest conceivable being must exist because existence is greater than nonexistence and existence is also conceivable... fails to recognize that the imagination DOES exist and "unreal" in the sense of "imaginary" is different to completely nonexistent. Not existent = not present, not anything at all, and imaginary/unreal= existent but only within the imagination. The problem is that "nonexistent" and "not real" are often equivocated and it's not clear which sense of "existence" is being discussed (actually present in any form of reality at all including the imagination on the one hand, and merely present in specifically external non-imaginary reality outside the mind, on the other hand).

I mean, the only thing that I know exists for sure is my own imagination. I don't even know if my external body is real. So if the ontological argument and my own personal evidence really proved God then all it would really be doing was proving that *I* was God. But if I'm also imaginary and so is everyone else that's as meaningless as saying neither I nor anyone else is imaginary and we're all equally real and then we're back to square one again.