God is so quiet

[SteveII]

Yes, and I agree, that per the definition that contingency has to do with dependencies (not just causal, by the way), then the universe is contingent. But it is not necessarily contingent on God.

Universe, here, meaning this local universe. Just to be clear.

If we're talking the totality of all things in existence (cosmos or whatever), then I think it is necessary because logic mandates it. But then, wouldn't this mean it's contingent on logical absolutes? But logical absolutes are abstract, aren't they? How do they exist independently of concrete things?

Like I said above. One such possible world is one that only has God or something like him--a immaterial mind if you will. There--a possible world with no concrete objects. This very clearly illustrates that the physical cosmos could have failed to exist. You can argue that some existence medium must exist to have a possible world. However, if it does not have to be OUR cosmos, then our cosmos could have failed to exist and therefore it is contingent on something else. 

Honestly, this whole thing gets me all confused when I think too deeply about it. Which is why I'm starting to think (and this is an advice mainly for me more than anyone else) that it's better to get theists to realize that God isn't in any better situation with regards to this whole necessary vs. contingent thing, and that if the whole cosmos is contingent, then so is God (after all, theists haven't shown that it's logically impossible for God to exist in one possible world and not exist in another, or that God does not depend on some necessary thing for its existence; they only assert that their God is necessary), and vice versa (if God is necessary, why not the cosmos). And so in this case, we go straight to the infamous razor and cut God out (no God needed).

It does not follow that if our cosmos is contingent, then so is God--at all. The argument is if our cosmos is contingent, what properties would a first cause have to have? Beginningless, uncaused, timeless, spaceless, changeless, immaterial, enormously powerful, and intentional?

When you get down to it, those properties sound a lot like God.

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Yes--because the definition of God literally contains the notion that he is not contingent. If you try to insert that he is contingent, you get an infinite regress--and therefore meaningless to insert that concept. 

As a matter of principle, God's necessity is an accidental property, not an essential one.  God would still be identifiable as God if he were contingent, so necessity isn't essential to the definition of God.  You may believe in a God who by your requirements is a necessary being, but that is you putting conditions upon your belief, not an indictment of the concept of a contingent god.  In a way similar to Kant's example that a hundred imaginary thalars share the same properties as a hundred actually existing thalars, a God that is contingent shares all the same essential properties as a God whose existence is necessary.  They are in essence the same.

God cannot be contingent. If he were contingent on something else for his existence, whatever that was would be God. Something at some point had to exist necessarily. It is simply easier to stop the infinite regress that would occur (Occam's razor and all). Also, part of the traditional definition of God is that he is the ultimate reality. If he was contingent, that very important part would have to be stripped away--and then you would be defining something else. 

As a response to the general question argued, no, a possible world where nothing exists is not logically possible because if nothing exists, then there is no "world" there. 

Fine. I concede that point. 

The universe is defined as everything that exists. 

materially exists. 

You simply cannot have a "world" where neither God nor the universe exists, because that by definition is nothing, not a world.  Duh.  A possible world by definition is everything that exists; if you have no thing, you don't have a world. 

I agree. I was made to realize my mistake and I altered my example of a possible world that only consisted of an immaterial mind (something god-like) or some other medium of existence to illustrate that it is logically possible that our universe could have failed to exist. 

So, no, the universe doesn't fit your definition of what makes something contingent, even if I agreed with it, which I don't.  (You are also unintentionally conflating imagine with conceive.  You can imagine a situation where nothing exists.  Whether you can conceive a situation in which nothing exists, using your definition of "logically possible" is a higher bar, and one you haven't demonstrated.)

Noted. I will clean up my phrasing. 

ps.  I'd like your input on the following post, HERE.

I will look at the link tomorrow and give you my thoughts.