Oh no not another free will thread.

[henryp]

The implication is that the all-knowing being dictates our choices through Its knowledge.  But why isn't it us dictating the All-knowing being's knowledge with our choices?

So you're saying, he's omniscent but not omnipotent so we can determine what he actually knows. Ah, clever.

Still, the point at the end of it all is that if you will do X, you will do X. That's just a tautology. So if that's what you will do, then you can't do otherwise. If the future is determined, then there are no real options.  

If there were free will, and I chose an apple, the all-knowing being couldn't 'know' me into choosing a banana instead.  Its knowledge is a solely a reaction to my future choice.

The problem would be that you still wouldn't have any 'choices' besides compatabilist ones.  

I think you can view knowing the future in a world with free will as a form of time travel.  Whether that's existing outside of time, and viewing it as a totality, or somehow being magical inside it, the explanation is time being non-linear.  Which is silly.  But all-knowing beings and free will are already silly.  Once you open the silly door, silly is on the table.

I don't think time travel is a coherent concept. And again, if ultimately the being knows what you will do, then the being knows what you will do. Maybe you will determine what the being knows... but how? That's where I would simply give you Strawson's argument.

But you say you don't believe in free will anyway. So I take it you are playing Devil's avocado? I mean, uh, advocate?

Yeah, it's just a thought exercise.  With an omniscient being, or really just a being with any knowledge of the future, and free will, non-linear time is how that would exist.  But I view knowledge of the future in a world with free will as being a form of time travel.  So when you say it's incoherent, I agree, but I think that's built into the premise of the thought exercise, not something I'm adding to it.

Regarding your tautology, if I were a free will omniscient believer, I wouldn't accept "you will choose apple" as a premise.

My premise would be:  In the future, I have the free will to choose between apple, banana, and carrot.
I will choose apple if and only if in the future I chose apple.
I will choose banana, if and only if in the future I chose banana.
I will choose carrot, if and only if in the future I chose carrot.

So you will choose apple if you will choose apple is valid.  But it's only true if in the future you chose apple.  If you chose banana, you will choose apple is false.  But this requires time travel.