Oh no not another free will thread.

[Angrboda]

I think I get what Lut is saying. The concept that you chose what you wanted to, but it's also what's predicted. The god or whatever may know what you would do, but it didn't make you do anything. But maybe Khem and Hammy are seeing this purely through what the possible outcomes are.

Sort of.  An impediment to free will, the freedom to choose, means that there is no choice whatsoever.  There is always a choice, however, for there is no instance in any moment of our daily lives where we don't have the option to choose what we are going to do or say or act or behave or wear or drink or eat.  A being knowing what we will do in no way cancels out free will.  Rather, it probably reinforces it.

The problem can be expressed as follows. Suppose that a sea-battle will not be fought tomorrow. Then it was also true yesterday (and the week before, and last year) that it will not be fought, since any true statement about what will be the case in the future was also true in the past. But all past truths are now necessary truths; therefore it is now necessarily true in the past, prior and up to the original statement "A sea battle will not be fought tomorrow", that the battle will not be fought, and thus the statement that it will be fought is necessarily false. Therefore, it is not possible that the battle will be fought. In general, if something will not be the case, it is not possible for it to be the case. "For a man may predict an event ten thousand years beforehand, and another may predict the reverse; that which was truly predicted at the moment in the past will of necessity take place in the fullness of time" (De Int. 18b35).

Wikipedia || Problem of future contingents

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Just because the being knows that you will choose the blue shirt over the green shirt does not mean there still wasn't a choice and that you still did not have the free will to choose between the two colored shirts.

You're confusing choice with free will. Choice is simply the ability to finitely deliberate on a matter and arrive at a choice. If decision making is deterministic, then we would still make choices, but there would be no free will involved. This is a common mistake in thinking about free will that choice is necessarily an example of free will. It's not. I can assign the computer the task of designing the optimal wing profile for an airplane. The computer will consider many factors, deliberate upon them, and choose a specific profile out of the range of possibilities. The only sense in which choice might entail free will is if you hold that deliberation itself is a free and not fully determined process. I see nothing about the fact of choice that requires deliberation to be so.