What would be the harm?

[The Grand Nudger]

No, moral realists do not depend upon the type of argument you're engaged in here.  Actual moral realists assert that there is some objective feature of the world which makes moral propositions true.  Actual moral realists reject constructs such as yours and Harris' because they realize that harm and well-being are subjective and thus they don't pick out objective features of the world and so they cannot form the basis of any moral realism.  As has been said of Harris, you think that you've solved the perennial problem of objectively grounding morals when instead you've simply done philosophy badly.  And here we have you simply reasserting what has already been shown to be wrong.  You're like Drich and Christians in thinking that simply reasserting something will make it true.  You've even said as much with your claim about having continually posted the same thing.  What you're not doing is actually answering objections, such as those given in my last post.  You didn't answer any of the objections there, or my Yoda objection to your rebuttal to my point about whether a wound constitutes harm or not, you're simply repeating yourself like an idiot.

Stop, and go read about intuitionism and moral objectivity.  Yes Actual Moral Realist™ make these arguments.  It's the only argument that naturalists and non naturalist both make....though naturalists really...really hate being reduced to it.  

You're welcome.

I was going to go through each of these, and I will in a limited fashion, but it's not really my job.  Apparently you didn't learn nothing from your last attempt at this and think that simply repeating your prior argument will somehow magically make it right this time when it wasn't last time.

I recall a smart person once mentioning that a person arguing with the definition of words had little left to say.  

All of the definitions given above either lead nowhere or to something subjective.  Why is damage or injury harm?  Because they negatively impact the desired function of a system.  You cannot damage a rock because a rock isn't a system and has no desired function.  As shown with the bloke who shot himself in the face, damage or injury is only harm if it is negative, otherwise it is neither harm nor damage or injury.  One simply has to consider it from a mereological perspective.  Something is damaged or injured if some of its parts are missing or non-functional.  How do we determine what are the appropriate and required parts of a thing?  By reference to its intended function.  I'm missing nine fingers.  That's only damage if I want to do something with those nine fingers.  And you chopping the fingers off a dead person isn't harm at all because you can't harm a dead person, regardless of whether you might through some teleological notion consider it damage or injury.  So both damage and injury necessarily refer to the purpose or function of a thing, and that is a teleological notion, and not an objective definition.

[
LOL, ofc you can damage a rock.  We do it all the time.  It's called mountaintop removal.  Damage doesn't depend on something being a system.  That you're missing nine fingers is damage regardless of whether or not you had any plan to do something with them.  Just as chopping the fingers off of a corpse is to damage that corpse. 

What you're blasting over is that you don't consider those things to be the morally relevant sort of damage you had in mind.  It's not a satisfying proposition.  It's not that I disagree with you in every instance -on that-.  However, I'll note that this urge, that you've expressed argumentatively in some doomed attempt to reassert subjectivty, could simply be moral failure, a problem of the agent, yet again, in an ethical context.  We propose that harm or damage done makes something bad or just -is- bad...and then, in a failure to consistently leverage our principles..see that something does do harm and decide that it isn't bad anyway.  The subjective agent fails to be rationally consistent and dives, instead, to constant appeals to subjectivity.  Quelle surprise!

*

Hurt is simply a a near synonym for harm which leads nowhere.

If there are brute facts of good and bad, as intuitive arguments propose, and harm is one of them..it -won't- lead anywhere in the direction you're going.  Everything will proceed the other way.  The brute fact has no explanation of itself, but is itself the explanation of some more elaborate thing or inference.  

Broken again refers to function, and function is another teleological notion which relies on intent and so is subjective.

Since we've already discussed the sensibility or possibility of a natural teloelogy, it;s simply not the case that any reference to teleology makes something necessarrily subjective in the sense that moral theorists are using that term.  

Made less valuable or successful?  Please.  These are obvious subjective measures.  Value is subjective.  What counts as success is subjective.

Def, I agree with you there.  Harm can be used as a subjective reference, but since it can also be used as an objective referant this one sense of the term will not help us to maintain that harm is subjective, only that it can be, like many other things, subjectively assessed.  

But we went through all this with your prior dictionary episode in which the definitions for bad were all shown to be subjective.  As noted above, you're simply repeating the same wrong arguments, ignoring and not grappling with the objections, and walking away with a smile on your face thinking that you have done well.  Instead, you're just behaving like an idiot.  As noted, it's not my job to show that all of the above definitions ultimately rely on subjective ideas, but your job to show that any of these definitions have an objective measure as a measure of harm.  Quoting the dictionary doesn't do that.  That you think it would, especially given your prior failure at this is astounding.

I'm repeating them because you are not engaging with them.  If you did, you might find that this is exactly the sort of thing that moral theorists are talking about, even if it doesn;t cut it, for you..or you were expecting something else.  As above, when you just didn't know that that the intuitive argument is the only thing that all moral realists have in common.  It's not particularly satisfying for all of them, either, though....and moral naturalists look elsewhere whereas moral non naturalists push it harder.

Why not, instead of repeating the assertions you've made before you try doing actual work and answering the objections given.  We can start with my objection that a wound is not an example of harm if the person desired a wound in their face.  Is that not true?  You responded to the trailer and insurance example by claiming that it was not what you wanted.  But that's just a subjective idea as to what should be desired, not an objective one.  In the case of the man whose trailer you burned down, who collected the insurance money, you did him no harm but actually helped him.  If harm is objective as you say, you need to show that the burned out trailer constitutes harm for the man who wanted his trailer burned down, because objective notions require the ability to show that someone was harmed in spite of them having a desire for the action to occur.  Get to work and show that.

I will stop repeating these arguments the very moment that you've shown comprehension with regards to these arguments.  If I want to contend that harm is objective in the sense that moral theorists are discussing, I only need to show that harm is not a mind dependent property.  The mans trailer is burnt down IRL, not in my mind or his.  That is all that it takes for something to be a mind independent property.  

As to whether I dismiss it out of satisfaction, I'll tell you the same thing that I told Drich and Huggy, even if I had such feelings, it would be irrelevant to the discussion as appeal to motive is a fallacy.  I've told you that it is not true.  The only reason you are repeating the suggestion is because you need to find some explanation for my refusal to accept your assertions that doesn't involve those assertions being wrong.  And so, obviously, you explain it by asserting and believing that my emotions and my feelings are interfering with my ability to reason properly about the subject.  This story has only one purpose, to make you feel better about your conclusion that you are right and put away any doubts that you are wrong prompted by an intelligent and philosophically astute interrogator disagreeing with you.  So far from me having such a motive, which you just dredged up out of your ass because you want or need it to be true, it's actually you that is showing himself to be lead around by his emotional needs and desires.  And I'll tell you the same thing that I told Drich.  Even if I had the motives you suggest that I have, it would not in any sense lead to the conclusion that those feelings were interfering with my ability to reason about the subject and come to correct conclusions.  But the fact is it's not true, I don't have such feelings, and this bullshit is just a comforting story that you are telling yourself so that you can feel better.

And now you have joined the ranks of Drich and Huggy with the quality of your arguments.  Proud of yourself?

Meh, more disappointed with you, for even thinking that the mentions of their name near mine would bother me or change these arguments and observations..honestly, lol.  

I think that you find moral realism -intellectually- unsatisfying.  Many people do, especially people who are just figuring out what it is.  It's difficult to argue against moral realists propositions..they're deceptively simple.  The main criticism lodged an the intuitive argument is precisely that.  It was a favorite of Moore, who had an immense effect on moral naturalism with his open question, but was himself a non natural realist (and in point of fact levied quite a few of the objections you have, in this thread..to moral naturalism).  The contention is that, if it's true, and there's no good reason in it's main thrust to argue that it isn't.....it doesn't really tell us anything about morality we didn't already know.  It doesn't shine down light on a complex or confusing subject.  It doesn't deliver the goods we're seeking.  It's a profoundly unsatisfying truth, if true.   

You're still confused.  It's not that you don't have a wound or that the bacteria or lion care about such, it's that a wound isn't harm unless its undesirable, and that makes the notion of harm subjective.  A wound, by itself, without reference to the wants and desires of some thing is neither good or bad.  Since it's neither good or bad on its own, it isn't harm because harm requires that it be bad (as well as your larger argument that harm is bad; if the wound isn't bad, and you consider the wound harm then that refutes your claim that harm is bad).  You're also confused about who has the burden of proof here.  You keep casting this as my attempting to prove that a wound has a subjective element and is therefore subjective.  You're right that this would not show that it is subjective.  However, I'm not saying that.  What I am saying is that any reason you can give for considering any state of affairs harm or bad is subjective, and my pointing out those subjective aspects is simply to show that the things you think are objective actually are subjective.  You haven't given me an example of objective harm, and until you do, all this talk of how these things are subjective and not objective is just refuting your attempts to prove your point, not my attempts to prove the reverse.

-and that's you not engaging, again.  Yes, it is exactly that I have bee objectively harmed that a moral realist who is also a naturalist is warranted in pointing that out as at least a part of the objective basis for their moral conclusions.  That is exactly the sort of thing they are talking about.   You are, btw, above..fielding moores objections to naturalism..which, as good as they are as objections to naturalism, they are not objections to realism.  A realist can make them and remain consistent to their own position.

I;m sure that you can find a way for anything I say to you to be subjective..but there's only one sense of subjectivity that is meaningful to moral theorists in this discussion.  Mind dependance.  That, and that alone, is what it means for something to be morally subjective.  If I refer to the fact that I have a wound, and i have a wound, then I am refering to a mind independent fact of the matter, and that's it, that's all, gg.  You might contend that it;s not a sufficient evaluative premise, but to contend that it is not objective..is..absurd.

So, more on moore and those objections to the naturalist reference to a wound from non natural realism.  It is proposed by some that moral properties are non natural.  That none of them can be reduced to biology, for example, to some empirical thing.  Instead, we simply observe or apprehend "the bad", and all that empirical observation can do is to signify that some x belongs in -that- set.  That, somehow, harm or some harm (but not all harm) is a token of bad but not bad itself.  It isn't required that a person paint themselves into a ridiculous corner asserting that harm is not or cannot be objective or is somehow fundamentally subjective in order to object to harm as the basis of a realist appraisal.  

You talk about moral realists above without realizing that it is actual moral realists who have problems with notions such as yours and Harris' being valid examples of moral realism.  I don't know exactly where the failure lies, but I suspect that you've mistaken common sense notions for the objective nature of harm or bad with actual philosophically rigorous ones.  Actual moral realists realize that you can't define bad so simply and have an objective definition of it.  That's why actual moral realists reject ideas like yours and Harris' because they see the problems with it even if you don't.  You, in your delusion, think this is because you have succeeded where others have failed when in reality it's simply that you don't recognize that you have failed.

Yes, moral realists, specifically, moral naturalists, have a problem with intuitivist arguments fielded by other moral realists, who are commonly non naturalists.  The problem, for them (naturalists) is that they will inevitably appeal to a form of intuitivism themselves - particularly when they go about demonstrating whatever natural fact they hope to pin their own concepts on.  Their objections are thus rendered inconsistent.  They don;t have to agree with the non realist, but they do have to allow for the validity of an intuitivist reponse even if they find it unsatisfying and seek to add more flesh..literally...to the spirit of that remark.   

No, that something can be subjectively valued does not mean that it cannot be an objective thing.  I readily admit that it could be an objective thing.  However, the fact that it could be an objective thing doesn't show that it is an objective thing.  You have to remember context.  You have been asked to show an example of harm that is objective and objectively bad.  You gave subjective accounts of its badness, primarily by citing your desire to burn down my trailer house.  I have, and will point out again, that your burning down my trailer house is only bad if you assume a certain perspective, and therefore it's only subjectively bad.  This does not show that burning down the trailer is not objectively bad, but what it does show is that your wanting to burn down my trailer is not objectively bad, which is a refutation of your point.  You're terribly confused about who is making the positive case.  I am not trying to establish that all harm is subjective in the case that you cited but rather that you have not given an objective account of how burning down the trailer house is bad or harm.  Those are your responsibilities, and you haven't fulfilled them.

-and to show that anything -is- an objective thing, we will ultimately have to appeal to intuitivist arguments.  I see it...you see it....it is observable and not mind dependent.  We apprehend the fact of it's existence.  So, while you or I may find ourselves wanting more (and we do, definitely) this actually would be enough to rationally ground an objective system.  It;s just that naturalist want to ground the objective system in something more visceral, and that's where something like harm or damage can come in..as a natural property of the act or consequence of x.  As something amenable to empirical observation.  

Now, if you like, feel free to show how any of the above dictionary definitions are objectively bad and harmful.  I suspect your primary attempt will be to focus on damage, but keep in mind the proviso above that damage isn't harm unless it's negative.  That essentially simply loops us back to the concept of bad, which we've already been through once, and to which it seems your only reply is to again axiomatically assert that harm is bad.  (And note that I don't need to show that damage has to be negative to qualify as harm even if the dictionary doesn't explicitly mention it because you do: you have asserted that harm is bad.  If damage isn't bad, then by your own definition it isn't harm.)

That proviso may be in error.  It commonly -is- the error that leads to moral failures of consistency, and thus moral disagreement.  The famous example is the boiled lobster, and this ties in with the non naturalists conjecture above, as well.  One person contends that boiling a lobster alive is bad, the other that it is not.  Thee people are in disagreement.  Is it a moral disagreement, though?  Maybe not.  A naturalist can then refer to the alleged fact that being boiled alive causes immense pain to the lobster, or can ask the other how they would feel boiled alive to signify what it is they are discussing.  The other person may, then, say "well, shit, I didn't realize i was harming the lobster, you're right, fuck me!"  The diagreement, in this case, was not a moral disagreement (as non naturalist realism puts it) it was an empirical disagreement.  However, all that the naturalist has done is show that boiling the lobster is harmful, he didn't show that it was bad..that much was already apprehended by the other.  

Now, you've got a lot of work ahead of you, and as noted, I won't have many opportunities to read and respond for a few days, so you're on your own for a while.  Make good use of your time.  Do not simply reassert your prior failed arguments but actually tackle the substance of my rebuttals.  And don't you worry about what motivates me, I'm a big girl and can handle myself, squirrely emotions and all, and besides, you've shown that you don't have the first clue about what I actually feel.

My "prior failed arguments" are the fundamental issues of moral realism.  The first stop in a great many different positions on the matter. Until you can accept that and them and engage this will be a pissing match where you call me drich, paint yourself into one ridiculous corner after another, argue with a dictionary.....and then storm off, lol.

As a recap to all of the above..in the end, I don't agree with these non natural realists contentions. I do, however, see that it's approaching something important and true about the moral landscape. That they lay out the pitfalls of natural properties as a foundation of moral objectivity. I acknowledge their fucking existence...lol. Can you bring yourself to do the same, and particularly in light of the fact that you do seem to find some of the objections compelling, yourself?

---

* this is actually my favorite subtopic in realist moral theories - how and why and what to do when we are or seem to be inconsistently leveraging our stated moral principles or evaluative premises.

So, using the example of harm applied in a seemingly inconsistent manner, how do we resolve that?  One way, is to resolve it fully after the initial moral appraisal is complete, as we begin to consider desert.  We can maintain that harm or damage is morally relevant, the semantics of how we do that are unimportant at the level of desert..because at this level we can say..and sensibly say, that while harm is bad in the general case and so all instances of harm deserve consideration..not all harm is equal.  Pushing you down and chopping your head off are not the same.  Defacing a cliff face in a natural park and burning down your house are not the same.  Some carry a heavier weight of consequence than others, even though all..by a plain reading of harm, are bad.  

Now, perhaps we might do this simply on the basis above, but there's also a compulsion to do this in that desert often carries morally relevant consequence, itself...not just for the person whom the judgement is being levied against, but also for the judge.    In effect, we say, "yes, this is bad..but it;s not -that- bad, or, yes, this is bad..but carrying through on some action against the person might be even worse."   At first blush, it seems like this, too, would be subjective and it often is...but that's not to say that it has to be.  That th question of how bad: cannot be resolved in some objective fashion.  OFC, it also doesn't entail that all questions of "how bad" will be..and there's a simple demonstration of why this would be so, imagining a world  (that we don;t currently live in) where bad was quantified in a objective and standard system.  

For this, we refer to moral dilemma and it's seeming intractability.   We're tempted to ask ourselves how, if this sort of objective quantification of "how bad" can be done, does moral dilemma persist?  Well, why is the sum of 5 and negative 5 zero?  Perhaps some moral dilemma persists and is, properly, un-resolvable...as the amounts on either side of that ledger cancel themselves out.  In those cases we could say that while both solutions are bad, they are not bad in a way that lends itself to consequential action.  That the agent chose between an exclusively suboptimal set of solutions and no choice was calculably -worse- than any other.  Whether a person save the people on the trolley, or the man the trolley runs over, or sits back and does nothing...all of these things amounted to little more than a shit sandwhich and we would not be within our moral license to penalize this person for any choice.  Everything rounded down to zero.

Now, I don't think that this is always the case..but absent some rigorous context of investigation (like cornell realism or analytical realism) it would be very difficult to resolve dilemma in a satisfying way.  So, in the interim, we err on the side of moral caution in consequence.  

Fun sidebars are fun.