What would be the harm?

[The Grand Nudger]

I'll simply point out that if damage to a rock isn't bad, then it isn't harm because by your own axiom, harm is bad.  

All well and good, but the proposition you;re responding to is that it -is- bad, even if that bad doesn;t rise to the level of an actionable offense against normative ethics.

It's certainly possible that there is bad that doesn't rise to that level, so..... 

: throws up hands :

In that instance, if damage to a rock isn't bad, but it is harm, then that violates your axiom that harm is [always] bad.  

If - failure to engage- than..failure to engage.  

In this case you either have to give up the contention that the damage to the rock alone is harm, or give up the axiom that harm is bad.  You cannot satisfy both conditions simultaneously which is why the example of the rock as an example of objective harm fails.  Since we appear to be out of examples, I say let's eat!  (Just kidding.  I know you gave other examples, I don't recall them at the moment, but unless they succeed where your rock example failed, they too will end up on the scrap heap.)

Later.

(And your last post is again one that I haven't read but only skimmed.  Patience, Neo, the answers are coming...)

Which is a contention that I havent given up (and this for conversations sake..remember), and all of your subsequent remarks to that effect are your own, and not mine. The rock example doesn't fail, you simply don't agree with it. Your disagreement is immaterial to -my- rock example...and why, fundamentally, because disagreement signifies nothing of realist moral import.

That isn't to say that your disagreement isn't consequential. It's just not consequential...to realism. It;s consequential in that iot sends you one way and me another..but the direction it sends you in is the direction of other other types of realists, all the same in their realism.

---

#moralrealismisfrustrating