What would be the harm?

[The Grand Nudger]

You keep saying that, but that wont make it true...and even if it is the case that some value is exactly as you describe it (and I certainly agree that it is), that won't be enough to demonstrate that all value is, or is necessarily so.  

Could you explain what obvious fault there is with the notion that we can, at least sometimes, recognize value rather than create it.. that this value is an issue of some value making property of the thing in question?

I could point out problems with the sort of value proposed in the oxygen example...as it relates to moral realism. That it's an instrumental good, for example..but there doesn't seem to be any obvious problem of objectivity there so far as moral theory is concerned. Nor in the fire extinguisher example, as it relates to objectivity and what might be failures or successes of objectivity that could express themselves as value disagreement.

I'm looking for something more than "all value is subjective because I/subjectivists say so".

Or, if you prefer, something obviously wrong with the notion that the mere presence of a subjective assessment of x does not, in and of itself, obviate the actuality or possibility of some thing x's objective existence. Both things can be concurrent, could they not?

That, to continue with the same examples..fire extinguishers really can be good-for putting out fires..even if theres no one around who wants to put out fires. That, if someone did want to put out fires, they value fire extinguishers for those properties that make them good-for putting out fires. That if they don't value fire extinguishers, but they do want to put out fires, explaining what a fire extinguisher is would give them cause to then value fire extinguishers.

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Or, if you prefer:

Can you explain why fire extinguishers can only be subjectively good-for putting out fires?  That a fire extinguisher could only be valued for subjective properties?  Or that no explanation of what a fire extinguisher is would cause a person to see anything but a subjective value of fire extinguishers?

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Or...and heres a real nasty one...imagine that some thing x actually is valuable because some other person wants it.  No particular use or anything like that, no good-fors.  No particular reason.  Some guy just wants it.

His valuing the thing is immediately recognizable as a subjective value....but how about yours as a middle man?  If the other guys wants it, then it has value, that value isn't an artifact of your mind..you're not imagining it.  He really will hand you money for it.  In what way is that thing not objectively valuable, even if his valuation is meaningfully subjective? For that matter, he really does want it, so there's the objective fact of his subjective valuation. Through all of this, you don't think it's worth shit, it's just trash, you're astounded that anyone will pay anything for it.

This last one I ask because it does seem to be the case that some subjectively valued thing can become objectively valuable as moral theorists discuss objectivity. Or is there something obviously wrong with that notion?
(there's a subtle kicker in there too...wonder if you'll spot it)