RE: What would be the harm?
December 5, 2018 at 9:47 am
(This post was last modified: December 5, 2018 at 10:39 am by The Grand Nudger.)
Your idea of subjectivity simply isn't the same as their idea of subjectivity. "Anything that comes from a mind" is idiosyncratic.... to you.
All of our propositions come from our mind. That would make the proposition "Your af handle is bennyboy" subjective..because it came from my mind. Can you see how puerile this idea of subjectivity is?
In contrast, what moral theorists are discussing, the question they're asking.... is that while all of our propositions come from our minds, at least some of them are true......could there be any moral propositions in that subset? Would it be possible to form a moral theory based in propositions which belong to that subset? This is -why- your blanket objection, from your idiosyncratic notion of subjectivity, is irrelevant to what they're talking about. For your objection to hold...for everything that comes from a mind to be meaningfully subjective with respect to their conjecture.....then minds would have to be literally incapable of forming any true propositions...including the proposition above. That your af handle is bennyboy. If your objection is valid.....that proposition cannot be true, because it came from a mind.
Do you believe that to be the case?
Similarly, for your objection to hold...
The proposition "oxygen is valuable to all creatures dependent on oxygen" cannot be true.
The proposition "fire extinguishers are good for extinguishing fires" cannot be true.
The proposition "all things that come from a mind are subjective" cannot be true.
Your conjecture is not only flat out wrong with respect to what moral theorists are discussing, it's self defeating. While objective moral theories and objectivist value systems seek to ground themselves in something exterior to the mind, there's simply no requirement that they not -come- from a mind, or be possessed by a mind. That would be absurd. This is the value of harm, as realists see it, for forming such a system. Harm may be a broad category of properties, but they are not imagined properties. We recognize harm, we evaluate harm, we hold the concept of harm...with our minds, yes. Some of us care and some of us don't. However, even if there is no mind around to recognize it, evaluate it, or hold the concept..and regardless of whether or not we care or do not care, those things referred to as harm either have or havent been done. Something has or hasn't been harmed. This is meaningfully objective in every way that matters to moral theory.
A competent subjectivist objection to harm (for example) as at least one of the potential grounds for an objectivist system of moral value is categorically -not- that all things that come from a mind are subjective...but that it may be the case that at least some of the things we consider harmful -are- meaningfully subjective...which is a good criticism, and a criticism that any moral realist can accept and has no reason or need to deny. However, to make that one stick, one will need to refer to something more than mere disagreement...as mere disagreement does not make the item in question subjective any more than the item in question coming from a mind does. That two people (or two species..but..there's no need to go inter-species since two people are capable of disagreeing anyway) do not hold the same things to be harmful, to continue with the example... can be a simple matter of having the wrong information, or lack of information, as it was in the case of an instrumental good like a fire extinguisher. Even more fundamentally, and again as the case of that instrumental good shows...there wasn't actually a disagreement of value, though it seemed so at first. This..is -why- disagreement will not reduce some thing to subjectivity. These same observations apply to oxygen, and the case of the drowning man and the man intentionally trying to drown himself. When two people disagree....one of them may be wrong.
Can we dispense with the notions that all things that come from minds are meaningfully subjective, and that disagreement establishes a meaningful subjectivity, now..and have a discussion about what moral theorists are referring to? A discussion about whether or not some explicit thing is a poor foundation for an objectivist system on account of it's meaningful subjectivity...rather than on account of some hilarious disagreement that you have about the subject matter..which is wrong...?
Your idea, for example, that morality is all about feelings..that's much better than this blanket subjectivism in principle, but the flaw in this is that it may in fact be the case that our feelings are..themselves, grounded in some external and true referent. Not all of them, ofc. We discussed the instance, earlier, of you seeing some poor kid getting stomped and that turning your guts. Your emotional reaction appears to be based on the observation of some thing..it's not spinning it's wheels on account of itself. One might wonder if whatever you observed, that turned your guts..that caused this emotional response, was a natural or non natural property of x, but that's not a subjectivists objection....and the mere presence of your feelings does not establish the subjectivity of whatever that observed x was...even if it does establish the subjectivity of you giving a shit about it. It may not turn my guts, maybe I hate the little fucker.
The question here, is whether or not whats being done to the kid is subjective or objective, regardless of the fact that you care and I don't. What is that thing, whats being done, what is it that you care about in this instance and I don't, what are we both observing that makes you sick and makes me laugh? Well....alot of realists well tell you...that -harm- is being done to that kid. Do you disagree. Is the kid getting stomped somehow -not- getting harmed?
The answer to the op question..where is the harm, seems to be -right there in front of both of us....... doesn't it?
All of our propositions come from our mind. That would make the proposition "Your af handle is bennyboy" subjective..because it came from my mind. Can you see how puerile this idea of subjectivity is?
In contrast, what moral theorists are discussing, the question they're asking.... is that while all of our propositions come from our minds, at least some of them are true......could there be any moral propositions in that subset? Would it be possible to form a moral theory based in propositions which belong to that subset? This is -why- your blanket objection, from your idiosyncratic notion of subjectivity, is irrelevant to what they're talking about. For your objection to hold...for everything that comes from a mind to be meaningfully subjective with respect to their conjecture.....then minds would have to be literally incapable of forming any true propositions...including the proposition above. That your af handle is bennyboy. If your objection is valid.....that proposition cannot be true, because it came from a mind.
Do you believe that to be the case?
Similarly, for your objection to hold...
The proposition "oxygen is valuable to all creatures dependent on oxygen" cannot be true.
The proposition "fire extinguishers are good for extinguishing fires" cannot be true.
The proposition "all things that come from a mind are subjective" cannot be true.
Your conjecture is not only flat out wrong with respect to what moral theorists are discussing, it's self defeating. While objective moral theories and objectivist value systems seek to ground themselves in something exterior to the mind, there's simply no requirement that they not -come- from a mind, or be possessed by a mind. That would be absurd. This is the value of harm, as realists see it, for forming such a system. Harm may be a broad category of properties, but they are not imagined properties. We recognize harm, we evaluate harm, we hold the concept of harm...with our minds, yes. Some of us care and some of us don't. However, even if there is no mind around to recognize it, evaluate it, or hold the concept..and regardless of whether or not we care or do not care, those things referred to as harm either have or havent been done. Something has or hasn't been harmed. This is meaningfully objective in every way that matters to moral theory.
A competent subjectivist objection to harm (for example) as at least one of the potential grounds for an objectivist system of moral value is categorically -not- that all things that come from a mind are subjective...but that it may be the case that at least some of the things we consider harmful -are- meaningfully subjective...which is a good criticism, and a criticism that any moral realist can accept and has no reason or need to deny. However, to make that one stick, one will need to refer to something more than mere disagreement...as mere disagreement does not make the item in question subjective any more than the item in question coming from a mind does. That two people (or two species..but..there's no need to go inter-species since two people are capable of disagreeing anyway) do not hold the same things to be harmful, to continue with the example... can be a simple matter of having the wrong information, or lack of information, as it was in the case of an instrumental good like a fire extinguisher. Even more fundamentally, and again as the case of that instrumental good shows...there wasn't actually a disagreement of value, though it seemed so at first. This..is -why- disagreement will not reduce some thing to subjectivity. These same observations apply to oxygen, and the case of the drowning man and the man intentionally trying to drown himself. When two people disagree....one of them may be wrong.
Can we dispense with the notions that all things that come from minds are meaningfully subjective, and that disagreement establishes a meaningful subjectivity, now..and have a discussion about what moral theorists are referring to? A discussion about whether or not some explicit thing is a poor foundation for an objectivist system on account of it's meaningful subjectivity...rather than on account of some hilarious disagreement that you have about the subject matter..which is wrong...?
Your idea, for example, that morality is all about feelings..that's much better than this blanket subjectivism in principle, but the flaw in this is that it may in fact be the case that our feelings are..themselves, grounded in some external and true referent. Not all of them, ofc. We discussed the instance, earlier, of you seeing some poor kid getting stomped and that turning your guts. Your emotional reaction appears to be based on the observation of some thing..it's not spinning it's wheels on account of itself. One might wonder if whatever you observed, that turned your guts..that caused this emotional response, was a natural or non natural property of x, but that's not a subjectivists objection....and the mere presence of your feelings does not establish the subjectivity of whatever that observed x was...even if it does establish the subjectivity of you giving a shit about it. It may not turn my guts, maybe I hate the little fucker.
The question here, is whether or not whats being done to the kid is subjective or objective, regardless of the fact that you care and I don't. What is that thing, whats being done, what is it that you care about in this instance and I don't, what are we both observing that makes you sick and makes me laugh? Well....alot of realists well tell you...that -harm- is being done to that kid. Do you disagree. Is the kid getting stomped somehow -not- getting harmed?
The answer to the op question..where is the harm, seems to be -right there in front of both of us....... doesn't it?
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