(May 22, 2019 at 2:54 am)Dmitry1983 Wrote: For: hard problem of consciousness. Matter can't generate subjective experience.
The fact is, we don't completely understand consciousness. But one thing we DO know refutes your statement. However consciousness comes to be, brain states cause mental states. That much is certain.
In my assessment matter can generate subjective experience. How it does this might be a mystery. As Searle says: mental states are causally reducible to brain states, however due to the presence of qualia, conscious states are not ontologically reducible to brain states.
What does this tell us?
First, it tells us that you are wrong in your assertion. Show me a subjective experience that doesn't correspond with a physical state (brain state) and I'll change my mind.
Second, it tells us that we don't know much about consciousness and (therefore) we should avoid wild assertions-- or (in your case) presumptions that reinforce your biases.
