RE: Is Moral Nihilism a Morality?
June 11, 2019 at 6:20 am
(This post was last modified: June 11, 2019 at 6:23 am by SenseMaker007.)
(June 11, 2019 at 6:16 am)Gae Bolga Wrote: Then, properly understood and held to be true, the positions do force a normative semantics about what you can and can't do. Should and shouldn't do.
This is a non-sequitur.
What's more, how can an incoherent position express normative function (or any function for that matter)?
Quote: It may be relatively minimal, but if you believe x to be true, then you ought not affirm y.
Here you're merely making a normative statement that you haven't backed up.
Not everybody agrees that true beliefs are morally good. And, even if they did, it wouldn't make them objectively right just because they all agreed with each other.
Quote:This isn;t the only implication available to demonstrate the ubiquity of normative semantics bundled in moral comments, even metaethical comments, but it would be enough if it were to make us wonder whether we can ever discuss morality without creating normative statements by default.
It isn't an example of it.
(June 11, 2019 at 6:16 am)Gae Bolga Wrote: If all comments on morality carry a normative structure, then a normative structure
You haven't shown how noncognitivist theories of nihilism, nor Error Theory, are expressing anything normative. I asked you directly how and requested, more than once, for you to answer that direct question, but you have still, so far, completely ignored it.