Is Moral Nihilism a Morality?

[SenseMaker007]

The overall coherence or incoherence of a position on morality and it's implications does not determine the presence or absence of normative functions, implications, or content, in my view. 

So, in your view, it's possible for an incoherent view to coherently express something? That seems like square circles to me.

In my view, an incoherent viewpoint can't coherently express anything and, so, that includes normative statements.

Sure, let's talk basics.  You wanted to approach nihilism above through noncognitivism.  An utter lack of truth aptness.  Is a lack of truth aptness the determining factor in the sheer presence of normative expressions?

What I'm saying is, regarding a viewpoint that doesn't even acknowledge the meaning or truth aptness of normative statements, from its point of view it obviously can't meaningfully express normative statements.

  Must a statement be truth apt, for a normative expression to be derived from it?

Not from its own point of view if from if its point of view you can't do that. There's nothing about ethical nihilism that says one ought to do or avoid doing X ... because if ethical nihilism said such a thing, even implicitly, it wouldn't be ethical nihilism.

 

You can help me to get to where you are from the bottom up.

I can try.

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...I'm not going to waste my time responding to the rest of what you say.

As far as I can tell you guys think moral nihilism is unintelligible for different reasons. Big whoop.

He's said a lot of things that are plain contradictory and he's claimed that I've said things that I clearly haven't. He has also insisted that ethical nihilism implicitly makes normative statements ... something that it can't possibly do by definition.

He says that him and I agree and you've said that him and I agree ... but I don't agree with the contradictory and absurd things that he's stated ... and that's what I'm disagreeing with.

Basically, Vulcan, I'm not interested in the fact that we come to the same conclusion ... I'm interested in our reasoning in how we get there. His appears to be full of contradictions and that needs correction. Improving our method of getting to the truth is more important than whether we've reached it. Because how can we trust our conclusions if we can't trust our reasoning?

Both premises and conclusions will always be less interesting to me than the bit in between.

Why don't you guys just take a break from ethics? How about some metaphysics. We have a Christian pushing dualism here... with a video featuring a neuroscientist failing at logic.

Because I find metaethics more interesting than Christianity and dualism.

I'm interested in theory of mind ... but dualism is plain silly. Sure, I could provide arguments against dualism ... but it's a very easy target. Much like God.

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Noncognitivist nihilism posits that moral operators aren't actually talking about what they're about, as opposed to cognitivist nihilism which asserts that they are - but get it wrong. 

And neither form of nihilism even implicitly states anything normative or that anybody ought to do or avoid doing anything ... and yet you insist the opposite. Don't you see that if an ethical framework says that somebody ought to behave a certain way then that framework is not ethically nihilistic? Explaining why to you is like explaining why squares have 4 sides. You're misdefining ethical nihilism if you think ethical nihilism can tell people what they ought to do.

Lastly, you still haven't shown where I made a normative statement.

Do you retract your claims yet? Because if you won't back them up one bit, and you are just going to continue with bare assertions and contradictions, then I think it's highly likely that you're either unable or unwilling to acknowledge your logical errors on this matter.

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I'll provide an example for you to work with and school me.

Vanilla icecream is the best icecream.  You should only eat the best icecream.  Therefore you should only eat vanilla icecream.  

This is a normative expression.  Which parts of it, if any, are truth apt?

I don't think it's truth-apt but if it is then that just means it's a statement that is capable of being true. But I only don't think it's truth-apt because I think the concept of something being "the best", without an expression of in what way it is the best, is incoherent. "Best" is meaningless without a qualifier. Even "tastes the best" would not do ... because tastes the best to whom? Your statement has to be meaningful before it can be evaluated. An incoherent and meaningless statement can't be truth-apt only because incoherent and meaningless statements don't state anything meaningful or coherent ... and hence aren't actually statements. If X is not a statement at all then it can't be a truth-apt statement.

Your example isn't relevant, anyway. There's nothing about ethical nihilism that says that such a statement can be true ... which is exactly my point.

Furthermore, your ice cream example just goes in favor of the fact that ethical nihilism doesn't say that such statements can be true. There's nothing about ethical nihilism that says anything can be better or worse than anything else. Ethical nihilism doesn't state anything axiological.

So there you go, schooled. Easy. Too easy, in fact.

And no, a statement that isn't truth-apt or coherent can't possibly express anything normative because a statement that isn't truth-apt or coherent doesn't express anything at all.

Perhaps we should make things simpler by asking each other yes or no questions so we have clearer views to home in on.

I'll give you many of my own for a big head start (you'll need it).

Is moral nihilism a morality? No.

Are moralities metaethical posiitons? No.

Are moralities normatively ethical positions? Yes.

Is moral nihilism a normatively ethical position? No.

Is moral nihilism a metaethical position? Yes.

Do normatively ethical positions express something normative? Yes.

Do non-normatively ethical positions express something normative? No.

Does a statement have to be truth-apt to be meaningful? Yes.

Does a statement have to be coherent to be truth-apt? Yes.

Does a statement have to coherently state something to actually state something? Yes.

Does a statement have to actually state something to state something? Yes.

Does a statement have to state something to be a statement? Yes.

Can a position that can't express anything at all coherently express something normative? No.

Can an entirely incoherent position express anything coherently? No.

Can a position that, from its point of view, doesn't acknowledge the existence of anything normative, express anything normative from its point of view where such normativity doesn't even exist? No.

Some of these questions are ludicrously trivial and obvious ... but considering that from my point of view they're ALL ludicrously trivial and obvious and yet you still can't seem to grasp them ... I thought I'd put them all out there.