RE: Is Moral Nihilism a Morality?
June 12, 2019 at 5:49 pm
(This post was last modified: June 12, 2019 at 6:02 pm by SenseMaker007.)
I'm aware of how things are classified ... I just don't always agree with the standard classifications because some of those classifications are drawn from premises that seem to imply that they ought to actually be categorized differently.
For example ... X is classified as a subcategory of nihilism by definition. But to know what X is we also have to know what nihilism in general is ... and nihilism in general might imply that X can't be categorized as a subcategory of nihilism.
Here's an analogy. Somebody comes along and says they've discovered a new creature and that that creature by definition becomes named an insect. But the creature has 4 legs. So it can't be an insect because insects have 6 legs. So I don't care if somebody wishes to define this newly discovered creature as an insect ... if it has four legs it's not an insect.
I always understood nihilism as the view that X has no meaning. So ethical nihilism should be the view that ethical matters have no meaning ... regardless of how many philosophers come along and wish to say that a denial of the existence of X suffices as nihilism.
But, I guess, nihilism in general *is* sometimes defined as a denial of the existence of something. It's not always about deeming something to be totally meaningless. I guess existential nihilism isn't necessarily fundamentally what nihilism is all about. If it is though ... then only noncognitivism is the truly ethically nihilistic view.
But basically, regardless of whether Error Theory is or isn't a form of nihilism ... I am justified in questioning the way philosophers classify things. Because, as per my insect analogy, things can indeed be miscategorized.
Besides, I think that the philosophers who don't question the way that philosophers categorize things are bad philosophers.
For example ... X is classified as a subcategory of nihilism by definition. But to know what X is we also have to know what nihilism in general is ... and nihilism in general might imply that X can't be categorized as a subcategory of nihilism.
Here's an analogy. Somebody comes along and says they've discovered a new creature and that that creature by definition becomes named an insect. But the creature has 4 legs. So it can't be an insect because insects have 6 legs. So I don't care if somebody wishes to define this newly discovered creature as an insect ... if it has four legs it's not an insect.
I always understood nihilism as the view that X has no meaning. So ethical nihilism should be the view that ethical matters have no meaning ... regardless of how many philosophers come along and wish to say that a denial of the existence of X suffices as nihilism.
But, I guess, nihilism in general *is* sometimes defined as a denial of the existence of something. It's not always about deeming something to be totally meaningless. I guess existential nihilism isn't necessarily fundamentally what nihilism is all about. If it is though ... then only noncognitivism is the truly ethically nihilistic view.
But basically, regardless of whether Error Theory is or isn't a form of nihilism ... I am justified in questioning the way philosophers classify things. Because, as per my insect analogy, things can indeed be miscategorized.
Besides, I think that the philosophers who don't question the way that philosophers categorize things are bad philosophers.
