RE: An Argument For Ethical Egoism
June 16, 2019 at 5:53 pm
(This post was last modified: June 16, 2019 at 6:01 pm by SenseMaker007.)
(June 16, 2019 at 4:46 pm)Rev. Rye Wrote: As someone who's read Hume, this looks like someone doesn't know about the is-ought problem:
I've known of it for years ... and this doesn't contradict it.
Not to mention that many people often misunderstand the is-ought problem anyway. Hume never said you can't get an ought from an is (in fact, it could be argued that he offered arguments for doing that very thing in his moral philosophy) ... he just objected to many people who jumped from descriptive premises to prescriptive conclusions without any justification whatsoever.
(June 16, 2019 at 5:53 pm)vulcanlogician Wrote: @Rev. Rye
I think what's being done here, Rev. is that you are considering two separate examples and treating them as one.
The "first" race is one that the runner ought to be able to win (presumably because he is more fit than his rivals). But then when it's time to run the race-- SURPRISE!-- now, you're running against Usain Bolt. There is no way that the runner can win now. But the race against Usain Bolt is actually a "second" example.
We can solve this problem by considering if Usain Bolt is going to be in the race BEFORE we determine if our runner ought to be able to win the race.
The runner doesn't think "I can't do this but I should.". Even if they think they can't win, or can't come second, they may just want to do the best they can. They don't aim for goals they think they can't possibly achieve and tell themselves they should achieve what they believe they can't.
Ambitious people may aim for a big goal that they think they have an extremely low chance of achieving ... but no rational person aims for something they think is utterly impossible.
Besides, I don't think the 'ought' with regards to competitive sports quite applies to moral philosophy. "I aspire to do X" is not quite the same as "I am morally obligated to do X".
I find it odd that anybody can object to the idea that telling somebody that they are morally obligated to do something that you know they can't possibly do is an unreasonable command.
