Is Moral Nihilism a Morality?

[vulcanlogician]

Many apologies for the delay in responding. Internet down since Friday.

Sure, let’s go with Popper’s Worlds. We’ll need to update them (given the advances made in the 40 years since) and based on clarifying this:
... and agree on some terminology.

Wikipedia summarises the Worlds as follows:
World 1: the world of physical objects and events, including biological entities
World 2: the world of mental processes
World 3: objective knowledge
So we already have a problem in that knowledge can never be objective or independent of opinion.

We disagree on this. To me objective knowledge is possible. It is a non sequitur to think that objective knowledge is impossible simply because subjective perception is involved in the process of attaining it. Science is a means to attain objective knowledge. Do you agree or disagree with this? We need to work this issue out before we can progress. [see below]

The diagram is better but still contains the ‘objective’ problem.


The problem arises from the realisation that World 2 encompasses itself and Worlds 1 and 3.

So, I propose this variation for appraisal:
World 0: the world of physical objects and events, including biological entities that is “independent of opinion” (the world that would still exist if there were no minds with which to observe, process and experience it).  Thus, the inexperienceable world.
World 1: the experienceable world of physical objects and events, including biological entities; the phenotypic machine’s external ontological dashboard.
World 2: the world of psychological / cognitive / mental process; individual perception and interpretation of Worlds 1, 2 and 3; the phenotypic machine’s ‘mind’.
World 3: the world of the output of World 2 (minds); concepts, abstractions, creations, designs etc. which when in a physical form e.g. art, text, numerals are a subset of World 1.

I don't like this revised model. It gets the job done, sure, but I think Popper's model is clearer. The problem is that in your model, World 0 is "the world of physical objects" and world 1 is the "experienceable world of physical objects."

I think ALL physical objects (whether experienceable or not) ought to be contained within a single category. Why? Because (while certainly there may be objects that are not experienceable and some that are) this distinction is irrelevant to the topic of ethics. 

However, I see where you're coming from. To you, the distinction is important because you think that knowledge which is informed by subjective experience is "not objective." I disagree with this. So this is the issue we need to focus on. [see below]

Thus, only World 0 can be truly objective since it requires no experiencer (an experiencer prone to, indeed designed by natural selection to, be subjective).

But Popper's world 1 requires no experiencer either. Even if every conscious entity were to perish, world 1 would still exist. (The same could be said of world 3). If every biological entity (or sentient being) were to perish even category 2 would still exist... it would just contain no information. Your model works; it just makes a superfluous distinction. Why not merge worlds 0 and 1 in your model?

This leads to the realisation that there can be no experienceable ‘objective facts’ only that objectivity is one of many useful ‘information quality criteria’.

Two things to say here.

1) "realisation?" Are you British or Aussie? I assumed you were American. But I guess you aren't. I'm a Yankee in case you didn't know. 
2) Objective facts are real, dude. They just aren't experienced. They're understood, comprehended, etc. (or misunderstood/miscomprehended in certain cases). You don't "experience" facts. Facts are world 3.

Regarding the comment about suffering: yes, agreed, “the importance of human suffering is yet to be determined”. But what we can determine is that suffering can belong to Worlds 1, 2 and 3 as follows:

World 1 suffering: data input; observation of pain etc.

The phenomena which cause suffering are in world 1. But suffering itself is a world 2 thing. Also, world 1 contains no data. World 1 also contains no observation. Data exists only in world 3. Observations exist in world 2. (However! The phenomena which cause observation exist in world 1. No doubt about that.)

World 2 suffering: data (and patterns of data; and patterns of patterns etc.) processing; experienced pain/suffering and processing of observed suffering.

Again, there is no data except in world 3. Data processing is a world 1 event.

World 3 suffering: data/information artefacts e.g. fiction, art, historical records about suffering; studies on the causes of suffering; plans to rectify or cause suffering.

Yes. This is all world 3 stuff.

[The below I referred to above]

The question we need to address here is this: Is science objective? I say that it is. But science relies on subjective experience to inform the theories within it. Let's consider the sun for a moment.

1) The sun exists. And it exists in world 1.
2) A biological entity (such as a human being) can look at the sun (ie. have a subjective experience of the sun... feel it's heat... see its position in the sky etc.)
3) A scientist with a telescope can make observations of the sun. These are subjective experiences.
4) From such observations, one may form a theory about what the sun is, what it is made of, why it produces heat ect. (these ideas are a part of world 3)

The thing is, science relies on subjective observations to give us objective knowledge. The sun is there, regardless of our opinions (objective truth). It is comprised mostly of hydrogen and helium, regardless of our opinion (objective truth). But we will never realize any objective truth about the sun without a subjective experience of it (ie. observation).

Some philosophers argue that science is not objective. They say it's a useful fiction. If this is your position, I cannot argue that morality is objective. 


I think science IS objective. I think science gets us closer to the truth. Also, to me, truth isn't subjective. Something either is true or it isn't.

If we can't agree on these things, there is no use for us to proceed into a discussion of ethics. But if we do agree, then this is a fine starting point in our discourse concerning the objectivity of morality.