Is Moral Nihilism a Morality?

[Belacqua]

I don't like this revised model. It gets the job done, sure, but I think Popper's model is clearer. The problem is that in your model, World 0 is "the world of physical objects" and world 1 is the "experienceable world of physical objects."

I think ALL physical objects (whether experienceable or not) ought to be contained within a single category. Why? Because (while certainly there may be objects that are not experienceable and some that are) this distinction is irrelevant to the topic of ethics. 

However, I see where you're coming from. To you, the distinction is important because you think that knowledge which is informed by subjective experience is "not objective." I disagree with this. So this is the issue we need to focus on. [see below]

@DLJ
This is the way I understand the model, also. World 1 is all the stuff that's there physically, observed or not. The observation occurs in World 2, but we are certainly reasonable to assume that World 1 stuff is real. Popper leaves open, and doesn't address in this case, all the old problems of noumena/phenomena, etc. All the questions of exactly how World 1 stuff gets translated into World 2 remains. 

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The thing is, science relies on subjective observations to give us objective knowledge. The sun is there, regardless of our opinions (objective truth). It is comprised mostly of hydrogen and helium, regardless of our opinion (objective truth). But we will never realize any objective truth about the sun without a subjective experience of it (ie. observation).

Some philosophers argue that science is not objective. They say it's a useful fiction. If this is your position, I cannot argue that morality is objective. 


I think science IS objective. I think science gets us closer to the truth. Also, to me, truth isn't subjective. Something either is true or it isn't.

If we can't agree on these things, there is no use for us to proceed into a discussion of ethics. But if we do agree, then this is a fine starting point in our discourse concerning the objectivity of morality.

Personally, I like this model because it clarifies the objective/subjective thing. I think it makes clear how both World 1 objects and World 3 artefacts are objective, though in different ways. 

As always, it seems to me that part of the problem comes about when people imply that "objective" means "universal and eternal." I'd rather say that it just means "not belonging to World 2."  

So some trivial examples: the camellia tree in my garden has objective World 1 existence, though not universal or eternal. Sherlock Holmes has objective World 3 existence, though not universal or eternal. Sherlock Holmes doesn't have, and has never had, World 1 existence. He occurs in World 2 fleetingly, whenever someone thinks of Sherlock Holmes. His existence in World 3 is the interesting part of Popper's model. His existence there is not the same as his fleeting occurrence in a subject, and is therefore an object -- objective. And as with anything objective (?) we can make truth claims about it. For example, it is false to say that Sherlock Holmes lives in Wichita. He lives in London. We can also discern the difference between the real Sherlock Holmes and parodies or "reboots," which are "inspired by" but not the same. 

So I think Popper's model applies to morality because we can say that moral principles are World 3 objects, which are concerned with World 2 states, and probably have World 1 solutions. For example: the conviction that suffering is bad is World 3, the suffering itself is World 2, and the way to relieve the suffering, in any given case, is probably through improved medicine, housing, nutrition, etc., which are all World 1. 

(Granted, there may be different attempts at a solution. For example Cognitive Therapy may address World 2 suffering though World 2 processes. Attempts to redefine suffering as a good thing without changing the subjective experience would be a World 3 issue.)