RE: Mindfulness or Mindlessness?
September 9, 2021 at 5:07 pm
(This post was last modified: September 9, 2021 at 5:09 pm by vulcanlogician.)
(September 9, 2021 at 4:12 pm)LadyForCamus Wrote: It was from Wikipedia actually. But it could very well be that I’m misunderstanding what they’re talking about here. Feel free to clarify for me. 😁
Yup. Thomas Nagel agrees with you, Camus.
I find his take on the mind/body problem interesting. Yet another contender for "a theory that might be better than functionalism."
Quote:Nagel famously asserts that "an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism."[2] This assertion has achieved special status in consciousness studies as "the standard 'what it's like' locution."[3] Daniel Dennett, while sharply disagreeing on some points, acknowledged Nagel's paper as "the most widely cited and influential thought experiment about consciousness."[4]:441https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_Is_...e_a_Bat%3F
So, to Nagel, if it is :like something" to be a p-zombie, then a p-zombie is conscious (and therefore no p-zombie at all). Dennett, a functionalist, disagrees with this thesis. Like Dennett, I'm a little leary of Nagel's theory... it is a rejection of physicalism after all. But his thought experiments are interesting.
Quote:The paper [What Is It Like to Be a Bat?] argues that the subjective nature of consciousness undermines any attempt to explain consciousness via objective, reductionist means. The subjective character of experience cannot be explained by a system of functional or intentional states. Consciousness cannot be fully explained if the subjective character of experience is ignored, and the subjective character of experience cannot be explained by a reductionist; it is a mental phenomenon that cannot be reduced to materialism.