(September 9, 2021 at 1:13 am)vulcanlogician Wrote:

(September 9, 2021 at 1:06 am)LadyForCamus Wrote: Sure. My comment about question-begging was in response to an article I was reading about the pzombie experiment being proffered as an argument against monism, specifically.  That’s where my confusion stemmed from.

Could you link the article?

(I understand if it's "lost to time"... just curious.)

It was from Wikipedia actually. But it could very well be that I’m misunderstanding what they’re talking about here. Feel free to clarify for me. 😁

Quote:Philosophical zombie 

Quote:arguments are used in support of mind-body dualism against forms of physicalismsuch as materialism, behaviorism and functionalism. These arguments aim to refute the possibility of any physicalist solution to the "hard problem of consciousness" (the problem of accounting for subjective, intrinsic, first-person, what-it's-like-ness). Proponents of philosophical zombie arguments, such as the philosopher David Chalmers, argue that since a philosophical zombie is by definition physically identical to a conscious person, even its logical possibility would refute physicalism, because it would establish the existence of conscious experience as a further fact.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophi...cal_zombie

(September 9, 2021 at 4:12 pm)LadyForCamus Wrote: It was from Wikipedia actually. But it could very well be that I’m misunderstanding what they’re talking about here. Feel free to clarify for me. 😁

Yup. Thomas Nagel agrees with you, Camus.

I find his take on the mind/body problem interesting. Yet another contender for "a theory that might be better than functionalism."

Quote:Nagel famously asserts that "an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism."[2] This assertion has achieved special status in consciousness studies as "the standard 'what it's like' locution."[3] Daniel Dennett, while sharply disagreeing on some points, acknowledged Nagel's paper as "the most widely cited and influential thought experiment about consciousness."[4]:441

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_Is_...e_a_Bat%3F

So, to Nagel, if it is :like something" to be a p-zombie, then a p-zombie is conscious (and therefore no p-zombie at all). Dennett, a functionalist, disagrees with this thesis. Like Dennett, I'm a little leary of Nagel's theory... it is a rejection of physicalism after all. But his thought experiments are interesting.

Quote:The paper [What Is It Like to Be a Bat?] argues that the subjective nature of consciousness undermines any attempt to explain consciousness via objective, reductionist means. The subjective character of experience cannot be explained by a system of functional or intentional states. Consciousness cannot be fully explained if the subjective character of experience is ignored, and the subjective character of experience cannot be explained by a reductionist; it is a mental phenomenon that cannot be reduced to materialism.

(September 8, 2021 at 9:10 pm)LadyForCamus Wrote: If they weren’t actually conscious, they wouldn’t be able to consider the idea one way or the other. 😛

Of course they can consider - they're just not conscious - in the thought experiment. That's sort of the point. Consideration doesn't require consciousness, so...why are we conscious (if we are) and what accounts for that I (if anything). The pzombie fails nagels criteria (and our own internal reference) by fiat to explore the implications of that state of affairs. Mostly, because those implications (and not the pzombes) are the useful item to people who argue from there to whatever else.

Dennet, for example, famously thinks that pzombies are a logical impossibility, if a creature was like us in every way..it would be like us in every way. This is also his response to mary the color blind color scientist..if she knows everything about color, she knows what it's like to experience color though she may not personally experience it. - However, the way he describes human consciousness makes other people think that they're pzombies.

Personally, I think it comes down to something brutally simple. A pzombie is a just a fancy calculator, and people don't want to be fancy calculators. A synthesis between nagel and dennet might be something like - anything that possesses any apprehension of what it's like to be is conscious..but consciousness is not exactly what it appears to be and/or reports itself as. For whatever reason (or no reason at all)..our consciousness, whatever it is, is appalled by the thought of being a physical thing. Even the most hardcore physicalist believes that there's a meaningful difference between their I and a toaster.

---

(September 9, 2021 at 1:06 am)LadyForCamus Wrote: Sure. My comment about question-begging was in response to an article I was reading about the pzombie experiment being proffered as an argument against monism, specifically.  That’s where my confusion stemmed from.

Specifically, it would be question begging if the argument used that assertion to prove that pzombies existed - but that's not what the argument contends to do...so it isn't. In the thought experiment, the pzombie is a direct observation and not an assertion - we're having a discussion about consciousness with it.

(September 9, 2021 at 5:07 pm)vulcanlogician Wrote:

Quote:Nagel famously asserts that "an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism."[2] This assertion has achieved special status in consciousness studies as "the standard 'what it's like' locution."[3] Daniel Dennett, while sharply disagreeing on some points, acknowledged Nagel's paper as "the most widely cited and influential thought experiment about consciousness."[4]:441

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_Is_...e_a_Bat%3F

So, to Nagel, if it is :like something" to be a p-zombie, then a p-zombie is conscious (and therefore no p-zombie at all). Dennett, a functionalist, disagrees with this thesis. Like Dennett, I'm a little leary of Nagel's theory... it is a rejection of physicalism after all. But his thought experiments are interesting.

I really like Dennett.  He doesn't like the standard categories like functionalism and physicalism, and neither do I.

Nagel's idea is not profound.  To say that being conscious means "there is something that it is like to be that organism" is pretty much just a description of consciousness.  It provides no extra insights to me, though I agree with it.

The only way to understand consciousness is to look at its functionality.  It is a process that produces a filtered narration and a sense of self.  How does it do that?  Looking at the physical nature of the brain, as well as the informational functionalism will get us closer to understanding that.

(September 10, 2021 at 10:00 am)HappySkeptic Wrote: I really like Dennett.  He doesn't like the standard categories like functionalism and physicalism, and neither do I.

Nagel's idea is not profound.  To say that being conscious means "there is something that it is like to be that organism" is pretty much just a description of consciousness.  It provides no extra insights to me, though I agree with it.

The only way to understand consciousness is to look at its functionality.  It is a process that produces a filtered narration and a sense of self.  How does it do that?  Looking at the physical nature of the brain, as well as the informational functionalism will get us closer to understanding that.

I really like Dennett too. His ideas about consciousness are cogent and coherent. His idea for how to sort out qualia (investigations in neuroscience) is a good one. (That's Searle's approach too.) However, I think it's a mischaracterization for Dennett to say "everyone has their own definition of qualia" as he does in the above video. I'm sure his critique is more accurate in his published scholarly work. It's understandable to cut corners in pop philosophy... just as Neil deGrasse Tyson describes black holes without resorting to equations... it makes for a better interview.

Nagel and Searle (and I'm sure others) have highly developed definitions of qualia. You aren't doing anything by pointing out that each definition is different. What I'd find more compelling is to chose the strongest (or best developed) idea of qualia and critique that. Furthermore, (again it's a pop phil interview) Dennett doesn't due credence to non-functionalists in that, nearly all metaphysicians acknowledge that mental events are 100% causally explicable by brain events. He acts as if working out where qualia "light up in the brain" will explain qualia. Not necessarily.

I also wholeheartedly endorse Dennett's method of working out precisely what qualia is on the neurophysical side of things. This will inform philosophers' thinking about the matter. I have some trouble seeing how it solves the reducibility problem, but who knows? Maybe it will. Whatever the case, I like Dennett's approach. I like Nagel's approach too. I think both philosophers are working on demystifying the issue, but from different angles.

You appreciate the methodological approach of science right? I know you do. Philosophy has dead ends, back to the drawing board moments, and the occasional erroneous idea... just like science. Gottlob Frege is considered a great philosopher of mathematics even though his ideas hit a dead end. He "took one for the team" so to speak, and we all ended up learning something when he turned out to be wrong.

I brought up ether before as an example of an idea that seemed more plausible to 19th century physicists given what they knew about waves. I think it's a good idea to keep that in mind when speaking of consciousness. Given what we know about the brain and consciousness, functionalism may seem the most plausible. But there ARE unresolved issues, and we should be careful not to conclude anything too hastily. We should constantly test our assumptions. And (like Frege) we shouldn't be afraid to be wrong. Because if someone proves me wrong, I learned something.

(September 10, 2021 at 7:56 am)The Grand Nudger Wrote:

(September 8, 2021 at 9:10 pm)LadyForCamus Wrote: If they weren’t actually conscious, they wouldn’t be able to consider the idea one way or the other. 😛

Of course they can consider - they're just not conscious - in the thought experiment.  That's sort of the point.  Consideration doesn't require consciousness

It doesn’t? You’re losing me.

Information processers can consider all manner of things without possessing anything we'd call consciousness. A pzombie can be subbed for any machine that mimics aspects of human behavior.

You consciously experience making toast..or so we all say...but the toaster makes toast without that. The question immediately arises. If you can make toast without being conscious....why are you conscious?

(September 9, 2021 at 5:07 pm)vulcanlogician Wrote:

(September 9, 2021 at 4:12 pm)LadyForCamus Wrote: It was from Wikipedia actually. But it could very well be that I’m misunderstanding what they’re talking about here. Feel free to clarify for me. 😁

Yup. Thomas Nagel agrees with you, Camus.

I find his take on the mind/body problem interesting. Yet another contender for "a theory that might be better than functionalism."

Quote:Nagel famously asserts that "an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism."[2] This assertion has achieved special status in consciousness studies as "the standard 'what it's like' locution."[3] Daniel Dennett, while sharply disagreeing on some points, acknowledged Nagel's paper as "the most widely cited and influential thought experiment about consciousness."[4]:441

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_Is_...e_a_Bat%3F

So, to Nagel, if it is :like something" to be a p-zombie, then a p-zombie is conscious (and therefore no p-zombie at all). Dennett, a functionalist, disagrees with this thesis. Like Dennett, I'm a little leary of Nagel's theory... it is a rejection of physicalism after all. But his thought experiments are interesting.

Quote:The paper [What Is It Like to Be a Bat?] argues that the subjective nature of consciousness undermines any attempt to explain consciousness via objective, reductionist means. The subjective character of experience cannot be explained by a system of functional or intentional states. Consciousness cannot be fully explained if the subjective character of experience is ignored, and the subjective character of experience cannot be explained by a reductionist; it is a mental phenomenon that cannot be reduced to materialism.

Sometimes I wonder how much of a role (if any) the development of language played in spurring consciousness experience. When I think about “what it is like,” it seems impossible to consider without the language necessary to identify and describe those experiences. So much of how we refer to ourselves and to the world we come in contact with is couched in metaphor and comparison. Though it could just be a failure of my imagination.

(September 12, 2021 at 12:09 pm)LadyForCamus Wrote: Sometimes I wonder how much of a role (if any) the development of language played in spurring consciousness experience. When I think about “what it is like,” it seems impossible to consider without the language necessary to identify and describe those experiences. So much of how we refer to ourselves and the world we come in contact with is couched in metaphor and comparison. Though it could just be a lack of imagination on my end.

To one who wants to say language and consciousness are related:

What about dogs (or even simpler organisms) who don't have a developed language like we have? Are they "less conscious" than we are? It seems to me that (in humans) language plays a crucial role in how we talk about consciousness. We also have developed mammalian memory systems that allow us to remember past events. (Not all living creatures have these endowments.)

I think these things, rather than skewing our intuitions about consciousness, allow us to form more accurate ideas about consciousness. After all, language and memory allow us to learn a great deal about the world that we otherwise couldn't. We can learn about the nature of trees, rocks, and other natural objects. I personally think language allows us to understand consciousness better too. To me, consciousness is just one natural phenomenon among many others.

Those who see the link between language, memory, and consciousness have a point. They are definitive aspects of our own conscious experience. It may be true that a fly can't remember what happened a few seconds ago. So our consciousness is different than a fly's consciousness. That means we can't "relate to the fly" as much as we can "relate to a dog." A fly's perception of the world has too much to do with "right now" for us to relate to what it might like to be a fly. But I still think it is "like something" to be a fly. It is just way different than the human experience for us to intuit it.

---

@HappySkeptic Are you a logical positivist? If you are, that may be where much of our disagreement in approach stems from. A logical positivist is apt to disregard much that I and others have to say about the mind/body problem and embrace Dennett's thinking.

(September 12, 2021 at 1:23 pm)vulcanlogician Wrote:

(September 12, 2021 at 12:09 pm)LadyForCamus Wrote: Sometimes I wonder how much of a role (if any) the development of language played in spurring consciousness experience. When I think about “what it is like,” it seems impossible to consider without the language necessary to identify and describe those experiences. So much of how we refer to ourselves and the world we come in contact with is couched in metaphor and comparison. Though it could just be a lack of imagination on my end.

To one who wants to say language and consciousness are related:

What about dogs (or even simpler organisms) who don't have a developed language like we have? Are they "less conscious" than we are? It seems to me that (in humans) language plays a crucial role in how we talk about consciousness. We also have developed mammalian memory systems that allow us to remember past events. (Not all living creatures have these endowments.)

I think these things, rather than skewing our intuitions about consciousness, allow us to form more accurate ideas about consciousness. After all, language and memory allow us to learn a great deal about the world that we otherwise couldn't. We can learn about the nature of trees, rocks, and other natural objects. I personally think language allows us to understand consciousness better too. To me, consciousness is just one natural phenomenon among many others.

Those who see the link between language, memory, and consciousness have a point. They are definitive aspects of our own conscious experience. It may be true that a fly can't remember what happened a few seconds ago. So our consciousness is different than a fly's consciousness. That means we can't "relate to the fly" as much as we can "relate to a dog." A fly's perception of the world has too much to do with "right now" for us to relate to what it might like to be a fly. But I still think it is "like something" to be a fly. It is just way different than the human experience for us to intuit it.

---

@HappySkeptic Are you a logical positivist? If you are, that may be where much of our disagreement in approach stems from. A logical positivist is apt to disregard much that I and others have to say about the mind/body problem and embrace Dennett's thinking.

Well, now you’ve got me wondering if “what it is like” is the best definition or description of what it means to be conscious, lol.