Well... we kind of hit a dead end with the 5 ways. Granted, I've not done due diligence on the matter. I watched a couple of YouTube vids and read Bel's article. I also read Spirit-Salamander's post, but didn't really dive into an argument when Neo challenged one of the claims. It's not like I spent 10 hours of study on the subject, and it may demand just that.
I do keep falling into a contemporary way of understanding motion. But I've spent some time trying to understand Aristotle's concept of motion. There's a real possibility (in my mind) that Aristotle's concept of motion just sucks. Or --put more charitably-- maybe it's like his teleological cause: it accurately describes nature but is superfluous. And when we begin to examine Aquinas with concepts that are not superfluous (ie. modern understanding of motion/change/growth) there isn't anything supporting the first way.
Again, I haven't really done due diligence. It's possible I'm selling Aquinas short here. But, so far, nothing has jumped out and nabbed me as being good support for the 5 ways.
It probably helps to have a god-concept one thinks is plausible to begin with. (Like the ontological argument). I wouldn't be opposed to trying Spinoza's god-concept (or something radical like that). Spinoza thought God (aka reality, aka substance) was fundamentally self-caused and unfolds according to its nature in a deterministic fashion. IDK if we can reconcile that vision of God with Aquinas, but it's the closest thing to a god-concept I have or can even possibly entertain. Spinoza is a big PSR guy (except the causa sui thing) so we have that going for us.
But this also raises the issue in circularity of reasoning. If we already need a god-concept to begin with (as part of our premises, as it were) we can expect that concept to be reflected in our conclusions.
I do keep falling into a contemporary way of understanding motion. But I've spent some time trying to understand Aristotle's concept of motion. There's a real possibility (in my mind) that Aristotle's concept of motion just sucks. Or --put more charitably-- maybe it's like his teleological cause: it accurately describes nature but is superfluous. And when we begin to examine Aquinas with concepts that are not superfluous (ie. modern understanding of motion/change/growth) there isn't anything supporting the first way.
Again, I haven't really done due diligence. It's possible I'm selling Aquinas short here. But, so far, nothing has jumped out and nabbed me as being good support for the 5 ways.
It probably helps to have a god-concept one thinks is plausible to begin with. (Like the ontological argument). I wouldn't be opposed to trying Spinoza's god-concept (or something radical like that). Spinoza thought God (aka reality, aka substance) was fundamentally self-caused and unfolds according to its nature in a deterministic fashion. IDK if we can reconcile that vision of God with Aquinas, but it's the closest thing to a god-concept I have or can even possibly entertain. Spinoza is a big PSR guy (except the causa sui thing) so we have that going for us.
But this also raises the issue in circularity of reasoning. If we already need a god-concept to begin with (as part of our premises, as it were) we can expect that concept to be reflected in our conclusions.
