A question about Thomism

[Angrboda]

This is a question for anyone who has an opinion, but I know there are several on the forum who are knowledgable about Thomism, so I ask.

How is simultaneity defined in Thomistic philosophy?

[Foxaèr]

Had to look it up, because at first I thought it was referencing the apocryphal Thomas. But it's just silly Aquinas. And poppycock, per usual.

[The Grand Nudger]

Depends on whether we're talking about god, or everything else. Simultaneity for everything else is exactly what you think it is. Simultaneity for god is something else, as god exists outside of time. So, for example, the sorts of temporal causes we're familiar with require some component of simultaneity in order to be proposed as a cause. For me to cut the cheese, the knife has to move with my hand, through the cheese, as I think about cutting the cheese.

For the a-temporal god.....well, I'm going to cut to the chase and say that there's actually no way in human language for me to properly describe what/how it is that god, outside of time, has simultaneous access to all moments in time, the source of it's future-knowledge. It has the descriptive appearance of simultaneity - but that must be false, because there are no moments -for god- for things to be simultaneous in.

Remember, god has every property, but possesses every property in an utterly different way than anything else. The only way I can think of to even refer to the idea is maybe to attach a G in front of it, call it Gsimultaneity, and leave the apparent semantic or linguistic contradictions as they are and without elaboration or correction - asserting that they can only be apparent and not actual, and that there's no way a human could correct them anyway.

In short, it's a fucking mystery, in the classical sense of the term.

[GrandizerII]

Not sure if there's a "technical" definition for simultaneity under Thomism (I can have a look later, see if there's an article that does do that).

My understanding is that (under Thomism) at any point in time, for any effect occurring, there must be a cause currently causing it. For Thomists, effects can't just be caused by past causes. This goes for all effects, including the effect of existing. Something cannot just exist on its own, but requires something current to give it its existence. Fast forward a number of lines of argumentation, and this gets to the First Cause needing to be in order for anything to exist. Even if the universe itself is eternal, First Cause would still be required.

Basically, they're not comfortable with the idea of existential inertia,so they need simultaneous causation.

[Neo-Scholastic]

IDK from what little I have read, the Scholastics had a folk understanding of time and had yet to develop a philosophical theory of time. Augustine professed it as one of those things that seems obvious until you start thinking about it and then you end up even more puzzled. So they punted.

[LinuxGal]

This is a question for anyone who has an opinion, but I know there are several on the forum who are knowledgable about Thomism, so I ask.

How is simultaneity defined in Thomistic philosophy?

Tom is confused about this, as he is about a great many other things.

https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1066.htm

Reply to Objection 1. The teaching of Augustine rests on the opinion that the angelic nature and formless matter precede time by origin or nature.

For the record, you would need to invoke a meta-time for anything to "precede" plain vanilla time, and it would only do so in that meta-time.

[Fireball]

Not picking on anyone in particular, but NX has been banned, while 5 of the threads he started are still going. Maybe they touched on a nerve? The only reason I'm commenting is because these threads are still alive, not because I find them interesting. I generally avoid this shit like the plague. Just a comment...

[Belacqua]

This is a question for anyone who has an opinion, but I know there are several on the forum who are knowledgable about Thomism, so I ask.

How is simultaneity defined in Thomistic philosophy?

Do you have a specific argument or quotation in mind? I'm just thinking that Thomas wrote a hell of a lot of pages on a hell of a lot of topics, and it's possible that "simultaneity" might have different nuances depending on the subject. 

For example if it's about events occurring at the same time chronologically it might be different than if we're talking about metaphysical causation. That kind of thing. 

If we knew the passage you're quoting, I suppose it would make sense to check the Latin, as well. As you know the translation of certain terms into English has caused lots and lots of confusion over the years. For example the Latin causa, as Thomas uses it, does not mean the same as the English "cause." So we'd want to avoid that kind of "false friend" mistranslation.

[Angrboda]

This is a question for anyone who has an opinion, but I know there are several on the forum who are knowledgable about Thomism, so I ask.

How is simultaneity defined in Thomistic philosophy?

Do you have a specific argument or quotation in mind? I'm just thinking that Thomas wrote a hell of a lot of pages on a hell of a lot of topics, and it's possible that "simultaneity" might have different nuances depending on the subject. 

For example if it's about events occurring at the same time chronologically it might be different than if we're talking about metaphysical causation. That kind of thing. 

If we knew the passage you're quoting, I suppose it would make sense to check the Latin, as well. As you know the translation of certain terms into English has caused lots and lots of confusion over the years. For example the Latin causa, as Thomas uses it, does not mean the same as the English "cause." So we'd want to avoid that kind of "false friend" mistranslation.

No, just some general questions about how time complicates things like Thomistic conceptions of cause. It seems that when it comes to a cause, either it/they must come / exist before the caused effect, or it is not necessary that it/they comes before the effect. But if a cause is timeless, how do we make sense of the questions? And it isn't aimed exclusively at Aquinas.

[Belacqua]

No, just some general questions about how time complicates things like Thomistic conceptions of cause.  It seems that when it comes to a cause, either it/they must come / exist before the caused effect, or it is not necessary that it/they comes before the effect.  But if a cause is timeless, how do we make sense of the questions?  And it isn't aimed exclusively at Aquinas.

Remember that in Thomas Aquinas as in Aristotle, "cause" doesn't mean the same thing as it does in English. It would lead to less confusion if we could just leave in in the original Greek and refer to an αἰτία.

What they're talking about here is not only the efficient cause (which is what we modern people mean by "cause") but all the things that must be the case in order for something to be the case. 

So when we're talking about "what caused our sun?" the answer would include the materials necessary to make it, and the laws of nature necessary to bring it about, and the time involved -- any and every thing that had to be true in order for our sun to exist. 

When we're thinking of examples, most causes are temporally prior to the effect. So the existence of the laws of nature, and of hydrogen, happened in time before the sun was made. Though of course to be the cause of the ongoing existence of the sun, the laws of nature and hydrogen must continue to exist simultaneously with the sun.

But not all causes in this sense have to be temporally prior. Some things which are essentially prior could begin to exist at the same moment as the things they cause. In other words, there could be a chain of essential causation, and the whole chain could begin to exist at the same moment. Or it could be eternal, with no beginning in time, and no time at which the cause hadn't yet been caused. 

So let's say that the universe started at a certain point. At the same moment the universe came into being, the laws of nature came into being as well. Though the universe is essentially prior to the laws, they are temporally simultaneous. 

For Thomas, God the Father is essentially prior to the Logos, but there was never a time when the former existed and the latter didn't. In fact Thomas thinks that we can't prove that the universe had a temporal beginning. But even if it had no start point, the Logos would still be essentially posterior to the universe.

For Augustine, the Universe began to exist at a certain point, and time began at the same moment. But the universe is essentially prior to time, even though there was never a time when the former existed and the latter didn't.