Modal ontological argument

[Disagreeable]

Premise 2 can't simply refer to logical possibility because that doesn't imply metaphysical possibility. Premise 1 has to refer to logical possibility otherwise there's no reason to even accept it. There's either an equivocation going on or nothing interesting is being said at all. We can accept 1 as trivially true if we're charitable but then premise 2 comes out just plain silly. And if we make premise 1 something stronger, and say that such a thing is metaphysically possible, rather than merely logically possible, then premise 2 is redundant, uninformative, uninteresting, trivial, tautologous, vacuous, etc—and then the question is just begged right from the outset. There's no reason to think that God is metaphysically possible. That's just assuming the conclusion. It begs the question.

Don't need to even bother looking at the other premises when the first two fail so horribly right from the outset.

William Lane Craig is just a skilled sophist and experienced Gish-galloper. But anybody even half decent at philosophy can deal with him very easily. Even if the audience falls for him, those smarter who know better won't. As George Carlin said: People are fucking stupid.