Modal ontological argument

[GrandizerII]

The argument assumes Axiom S5, which is often fine as long as you're consistent with the axioms you use.

Personally, I don't bother with objections related to S55 axiom and such. I just look at the first premise and see that's where the primary issue is. Either you accept the possibility of a maximally great being or you don't. If you do, the argument pretty much works. If you don't, then it's not going to be compelling to you.

[Fake Messiah]

Either you accept the possibility of a maximally great being or you don't. If you do, the argument pretty much works. If you don't, then it's not going to be compelling to you.

Geez, if you accept an all-powerful magical being, then you don't need Axiom S5 or some other philosophical claptrap because it's all just window dressing for your magical thinking

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

If, in any constructed proof in any logic system, the axia can be doubted, then the conclusion can be safely doubted. This seems to be the fundamental weakness of ontological attempts at proving God.

-How do we know that the existence of maximal excellence is even possible? 

-How can the inherent conflict between omniscience and omnipotence be resolved?

-What - exactly - is 'wholly good'?

-I can easily imagine a possible world in which a being could not be omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good.

-It is not readily apparent that possibility of a maximally great being entails the existence of a maximally great being.

It strikes me that Anselm and all of his philosophical descendants have taken great pains to ensure that they set the parameters they need to achieve the conclusion they want (and no other). Let's set different parameters to see how silly the whole thing is:

-A being has maximal excellence in a given possible world W if and only if it has long ears, eats clover, and hops about in W.

(leaving out the middle bits)

-Therefore, rabbits are maximally great beings.

Boru

[Jehanne]

A great book on this subject, that mentions Craig by name, is Dot, Dot, Dot: Infinity Plus God Equals Folly by Dr. James A. Lindsay who, like our own Polymath, is a PhD pure mathematican. Kurt Gödel had a similar proof of God’s existence; WLC likes to be a copycat, a source of revenue for him, a communications major from Wheaton College.

[Disagreeable]

Premise 2 can't simply refer to logical possibility because that doesn't imply metaphysical possibility. Premise 1 has to refer to logical possibility otherwise there's no reason to even accept it. There's either an equivocation going on or nothing interesting is being said at all. We can accept 1 as trivially true if we're charitable but then premise 2 comes out just plain silly. And if we make premise 1 something stronger, and say that such a thing is metaphysically possible, rather than merely logically possible, then premise 2 is redundant, uninformative, uninteresting, trivial, tautologous, vacuous, etc—and then the question is just begged right from the outset. There's no reason to think that God is metaphysically possible. That's just assuming the conclusion. It begs the question.

Don't need to even bother looking at the other premises when the first two fail so horribly right from the outset.

William Lane Craig is just a skilled sophist and experienced Gish-galloper. But anybody even half decent at philosophy can deal with him very easily. Even if the audience falls for him, those smarter who know better won't. As George Carlin said: People are fucking stupid.

[Jehanne]

What does it mean to be "maximally great"? I think that the whole argument falls on its face at Premise 1.

[GrandizerII]

If, in any constructed proof in any logic system, the axia can be doubted, then the conclusion can be safely doubted. This seems to be the fundamental weakness of ontological attempts at proving God.

What can be reasonably doubted about Axiom S5?

-I can easily imagine a possible world in which a being could not be omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good.

It's not about whether you can imagine such a world as it's not about logical possibility here.

The question is, is such a being metaphysically possible and therefore metaphysically necessary? In other words, is it possible for such a being to be rooted in reality?

-It is not readily apparent that possibility of a maximally great being entails the existence of a maximally great being.

The underlying logic entails that anything that is possibly necessary exists in the actual world as it exists in all possible worlds (including the actual world).

The maximally great being, according to Plantinga, is intuitively seen as a necessary being.

It strikes me that Anselm and all of his philosophical descendants have taken great pains to ensure that they set the parameters they need to achieve the conclusion they want (and no other). Let's set different parameters to see how silly the whole thing is:

-A being has maximal excellence in a given possible world W if and only if it has long ears, eats clover, and hops about in W.

(leaving out the middle bits)

-Therefore, rabbits are maximally great beings.

No theist accepts that a maximally great being is physical. To the typical theist, anything that is physical is contingent, not necessary. Therefore, to the theist, such a being that you speak of is not necessary and therefore not maximally great.

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What does it mean to be "maximally great"?  I think that the whole argument falls on its face at Premise 1.

To Plantinga, a maximally great being is a being that is omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good, and is so in all possible worlds.

[Disagreeable]

What does it mean to be "maximally great"?

It means to brownnose the sophist presenting the stupid argument.

[Jehanne]

What does it mean to be "maximally great"?  I think that the whole argument falls on its face at Premise 1.

To Plantinga, a maximally great being is a being that is omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good, and is so in all possible worlds.

An even greater being than that can be conceived.

[Disagreeable]

To Plantinga, a maximally great being is a being that is omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good, and is so in all possible worlds.

Yeah, I've heard him give that definition before. But what I don't understand is why we have a Christian philosopher like him effectively admitting to worshipping me. I'm OOO in all worlds.