Illustrating the burden of proof - pay me!

[emjay]

a complex/multi-faceted all-powerful being... that is far more complicated than that which it was invoked to explain

Just because I have to maintain my reputation as someone who's picky about details....

All the theology we've been talking about here -- the Ontological Argument, the 5 Ways, etc. -- posit a God who is absolutely simple, with no parts, divisions, or complications. 

Their argument is that to explain the (apparent) complexity of the world requires an absolutely non-complex ground.

(This changed with Jacob Boehme, so there are people after him who don't hold to Divine Simplicity: Blake, Schelling, Hegel, etc. But they're a different kettle of fish.)

Yes, I'm aware of that claim, since you've brought it up before. Granted I don't know the details but on the face of it I don't... can't... put much stock in the idea because to me, a logically coherent concept is more than just a list of features, but rather a description of how those features fit together - eg structurally, mechanically, functionally etc - into a coherent whole, and as such that description becomes necessarily more complex the more features you're trying to integrate. So if the claim is that this proposed multi-featured entity... an all-seeing, all-knowing, intelligent being... exists with no parts, divisions, or complications; has no structure or inner workings of any kind, then frankly that seems incoherent nonsense to me, wishful thinking at best. And if any part of the justification for that is that it's outside the physical realm and therefore not subject to the same sorts of ideas of composition etc, then for me that doesn't help matters at all because then you're into the realms of pure speculation, limited only by your imagination and not even slightly grounded in the known reality, so again, wishful thinking at best.

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They are similar conceptually, but my issue is that though both propose a fundamental ground, theism makes much more speculative assumptions to do so, and seems to end up proposing a much more complicated fundamental ground than that which it is attempting to replace in the known universe. Ie in a nutshell, theism seems to look at the circular contigency evident in the universe, unable to accept that any part of it could be fundamental, even in principle, and instead asks 'how did any of this come to be, from nothing?', then with complicated logic (eg the Five Ways etc) it proposes a solution that by the nature of parts of its definition, entails that the solution is exempt from those sorts of questions (ie via the concepts of necessary/non-contingent), but does so at the expense of proposing a new fundamental thing of the universe/reality... a complex/multi-faceted all-powerful being... that is far more complicated than that which it was invoked to explain, and thus far less likely to just happen to exist for all eternity 'just because' or as Belacqua said Aquinas would put it '[for] no reason'.

So from my point of view, all it does is replace one (or many) plausible and scientifically addressable fundamentals, as yet discovered or not, in the known universe, with one speculative and unfalsifiable centralised fundamental, at the gain of some mental reassurance/i's dotted and t's crossed in the form of the theological logic, but without ultimately addressing the underlying question of how something rather than nothing exists or comes to be, because it cannot answer the question as pertaining to itself. And to the extent that it is claimed that it doesn't need to (ie by definition of necessary/non-contigent) that's ultimately what I was asking you about... whether a) that truly closes the book for you on that question, in the case that you accept that the definition is a complete answer to God's existence requiring no further explanation, or to put it as boldly as Aquinas would (to again quote Belacqua surmising Aquinas) 'there is no reason for God's existence, because God is not contingent', or b) that you still have such questions but out of necessity/practicality accept you can't answer them. But in either case seemingly accepting God as a brute fact/fundamental. I'm not asking for an answer again if you don't want to give it... I appreciate your answer from before, which seemed to be neither of these... but just restating/clarifying my thinking around this in the context of this new post of yours.

Epistemically, we're bound to hit a dead point when we're trying to figure out why something rather than nothing or why this rather than that? As per Munchhausen's trilemma, you're either going to posit a brute fact as the ending point, go with a circular explanation, or appeal to an infinite regress of sorts. There's no way around that. For theists generally, having God as a brute fact is how they ultimately make sense of everything in existence, only because intuitively, God (as the ground of being) is seen as metaphysically necessary, while an arbitrary physical universe is not intuitively seen as such. It all comes down to intuition at the end. We can't say for sure this universe is contingent or necessary, but it feels like it is contingent because we can imagine a slightly different universe instead in place of the actual universe. To make the view that physical reality (whether comprising only this universe or multiple universes) is not contingent far more intuitive, one would probably have to go with some extreme view of modality. For example, necessitarianism (this world/universe exists as is because it exists necessarily as is) or a more radical form of it, called modal realism (all possible worlds exist and exist necessarily).

Or you can ditch the PSR and just say the universe is contingent but it just is.

Of course, theists also have to grapple with issues regarding God being necessary while everything else in existence is not. Modal collapse arguments, in their various forms, are examples to counter that view.

I don't disagree we all end up in this deadlock, this three way tie, that you're mentioning here and Neo mentioned earlier. It's just that I'd have a lot more respect for the theist position if it would admit that it doesn't really answer the question it thinks it answers, only defers it in a sense.

I'll read the rest in depth later cos I need to go to bed now.