Metaethics Part 1: Cognitivism/Non-cognitivism

[Disagreeable]

I struggle to understand noncognitivism. I get the whole "Yay!" and"Boo!" approach but to me they're just not taking moral claims as claims about morality which is, surely, what moral claims are. How are they not seeing moral claims? I don't get it. I am aware that there are some serious philosophers who take it seriously, and have strong arguments, supposedly, but I personally find it all very unconvincing indeed. And that's still putting it mildly.

I'd need a reason to reject cognitivism because it makes sense on the face of it AFAIC. And I haven't seen one reason yet.

I agree with Vulcanlogician that error theory is the most sensible form of moral anti-realism. I would also be an error theorist if I wasn't a moral realist. I mean, actually I'd probably stop by at Quasi Realism first and take error theory as a last resort. Because at least these are all cognitivist theories. I don't get noncognitivsm at all. I just don't get it. I understand what noncognitivists believe but I see the whole universe that we live in as fundamentally rational so for me to change my mind on this issue I think I'd have to change my fundamental metaphysics and epistemology!