Metaethics Part 1: Cognitivism/Non-cognitivism

[John 6IX Breezy]

To me, it is the ethicist's job to address the validity of normative value claims. Error theory does this... "No moral claim can be true."

I want to propose my own spin on Emotivism (let me know what you think).

Given that moral intuitions precede moral reasoning, I would argue that statements such as murder is wrong, when proposed by any intelligent organism, are not factual or objective. They do not intentionally describe something true or false about reality, rather, they describe behaviors that produce fitness payoffs.

I'm borrowing the term fitness payoffs from psychologist Donald Hoffman. He proposes that we are not tuned to perceive reality as it is, but rather an abstraction designed to increase fitness (procreation, survival, longevity, etc.). I am essentially blending both ideas (fitness payoffs and moral intuitions), such that our moral intuitions are likewise abstractions that increase fitness payoffs. They are icons in our ethical computer screen rather than transistors grounded in reality.