Proving What We Already "Know"

[Belacqua]

Yes, I'm not so sure about the ability to pull back the veil either.  So far, I've settled for "truth in context."  For example, in the context of living one's day-to-day life, it could be true that Brenda in the office is an annoying bitch.  It doesn't really matter if Brenda-the-bitch is a hallucination, or if the world including her is illusory, or if I'm dreaming.  But if I find myself out of that context (say by waking up), then clinging to Brenda-is-a-bitch is no longer guaranteed to be true.

It seems to me that the existence of Brenda should be fairly easy to demonstrate, intersubjectively. I mean, there's always the remote possibility that we're brains in vats and she's a projection, but mostly I think we can have confidence. 

On the other hand the idea that she's a bitch might be more open to interpretation. To test bitchiness scientifically we'd have to set up some criteria, and these might well be subjective or culture-specific. For example an unwillingness to make small talk or a cold affect in her behavior would read differently in the US and in Japan. (Starbuck's baristas in Japan have been trained to be smiley and chatty like Americans, and frankly it comes across as a little creepy, in contrast to what we're used to.)

Right-wingers are fond of the word "Scientism."  They mean it as an epithet for a kind of godless religion, where sheep blindly believe phony assertions made by Scientific grand wizards up in some tower of conspiracy.

I don't believe any of that, not even a little bit.  However, I definitely would say that many who point to science as a subsitute for religion, philosophical inquiry or introspective insight are unaware that the truth of their world view is limited by the context defined by its axioms and its application.

I'm about as left-wing as a person can get, and I see scientism all over the place. Maybe I'm defining it a tad differently. 

I see it as scientism when people try to apply scientific methods to areas where those methods are inappropriate -- like determining quality in the arts, or (as you point out) in making moral choices. 

Also I'd call it scientism when people assert that only those questions which can be addressed by science are legitimate questions, or worthwhile. Or when people just beg the question and declare that nothing outside the realm of science could possibly be real or important. 

I guess this does start to take on characteristics of religion, in the worst sense, in that for some it becomes dogma that one must accept to be considered a serious person.

And maybe scientism is like a religion in that both are unsatisfied with anything less than the Truth. Mere truth-in-context, as you describe it, won't be good enough for those who insist on some sort of ultimate something, behind or above everything. 

For example, while science can help us develop new ideas about morality, for example by giving us new insights into how much agency we really do / don't have in certain situations, it cannot be the basis for a moral system.  That is because "right" and "wrong" are not measurable objective properites, and science is defined by this axiom-- that it is the study of measurable objective properties.

So where does that leave people who hold that the only reality is a material monism, and the only way to navigate a material monism is through scientific inquiry?  They will have real trouble describing consciousness, morality, cosmogony, and so on, but will jealously guard against other avenues for considering those things.

Big questions!

For starters, I'd lay out two fields: phenomenology and the arts. 

The former ponders what we experience, rather than what's "out there." The latter interprets and takes seriously what those experiences are, and converts them from individual fleeting states to something we can share and hold dear.

Neither will satisfy people who want Truth.