The Principle of Contingent Causation: The Impossibility of Infinite Regress.

[Belacqua]

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Yes, it's a persistent language problem. I also think that a lot of Christians should be more careful about this. 

Our thinking is structured largely by the language we use. Unfortunately English concepts often don't map well onto Aristotelian or Thomist ones. So there is always a danger of confusion concerning "a being" or "an entity," as well as, as I mentioned, "cause." 

(For example, Japanese has different nouns for a tangible thing and an intangible thing. So from the start it's generally clear what kind of "thing" we're talking about -- in some cases it's clearer than English. There is also a rich vocabulary for philosophy in this vein, addressing materiality and ideality. All this is inherited from Buddhist thought.)

It's the sort of thing that people can work out. When both sides are friendly and open-minded, we can ask for clearer definitions and make things clearer. I understand that's not a very common state for conversations.

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Yes, the argument in the OP is far from complete or persuasive as it stands. It is one part of a systematic theology. 

For example all of the Five Ways hold that infinite regress is impossible, but don't explain that within the argument itself. That's why I always say that none of them is a self-contained argument, but more like a syllabus for a semester-long college class. Each step of the argument has prerequisites. Of course Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas have elaborate arguments as to why infinite regress isn't possible. 

So again, in a friendly conversation we can certainly ask "wait a minute, why isn't infinite regress possible?" and then ideally that could be explained also -- and rebutted and discussed. 

And as I said before, none of the Five Ways addresses why a First Cause is "his particular godling." That calls for several further arguments.

As you say, it needs a big boat. 

I don't know if the OP is willing to go to those lengths, or if he's aware of the prerequisites we'd need to find his argument sensible. Often I try to discuss these things with people and they seem unwilling to have a conversation.

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None of this addresses the fact that at its root the argument requires special pleading.

~ Everything that comes to be and passes away is contingent.
~ The causal chain of contingent things cannot be an infinite regress (for reasons explained elsewhere).
~ Therefore there needs to be one non-contingent thing at the origin of the chain of contingent things.

Which part of this is special pleading?