The Principle of Contingent Causation: The Impossibility of Infinite Regress.

[Angrboda]

I probably should be doing other things this morning, but seeing as Nishant Xavier seems to believe his work on this topic is finished, I will present two counterarguments.

First, as to whether you can achieve an infinity by successive addition of moments. There are three cases here:
1. A past infinity of moments;
2. An infinite number of successive additions of moments;
3. A finite past and a finite number of successive additions.

In cases 1 and 2, an infinite set of moments added to any finite set results in an infinite set of moments and thus proves the opposite. This is basic math. So only the third case is of any concern. However, if you are performing successive additions upon a finite set as an analogy to a past infinite universe, then you have created a false analogy because it is not being suggested that the universe at some point is past finite. If you are assuming the universe is past finite at some point in your argument, then you would be begging the question at that point. So, no, your argument about successive addition doesn't prove anything; it is a non sequitur. It's true that any finite number of successive additions to a finite set only results in a finite set, but the set of moments in a past eternal universe is not finite and so your argument simply does not apply.

The main problem is that there are equivocations in your and Craig's argument. It is never stated whether the set of moments you are adding to is finite or infinite, but since the argument requires a finite set in order to succeed, it is necessarily implying that you start with a finite set of moments. It also does not specify whether the successive additions are finite or infinite, but again, in order for the argument to work, the additions must be finite. However, the conclusion is arguing that a past eternal universe cannot arrive at the present through successive addition based upon this argument which implicitly assumes you are starting with a finite past, which you are not. So the conclusion equivocates on the initial condition and is therefore invalid. It does not follow from either you or Craig's argument that you cannot get to the present moment by successive addition to an infinite past; the argument is a non sequitur.

As to the first cause argument itself, I am going to refute Aquinas' First Way as well as the Kalam Cosmological Argument.

For the sake of argument, consider a hypothetical. Consider that there is no absolute law of uniformitarianism so that things in the past may not be consistent with things in the present. Now let us consider a hypothetical. Suppose the law that things that begin to exist have a cause was not true at some distant point in the past. There is no inconsistency here unless uniformitarianism is a law, and it is not. Under such conditions a universe began to exist, without cause, because that is simply what things did at the time, so there is no violation there. A while after the universe came into existence, a god came into existence similarly. This god need not be the Judeo-christian god, but was similar in that it was omnipotent. This god was also good, though perhaps not perfectly so. This god realized that if evils were allowed to come to exist without cause, then that could be a real problem, and so this god caused reality to no longer allow things to come into existence unbidden. Thus we have the universe we have today, the universe began to exists as postulated, and there is a law that things that begin to exist have causes. Everything that the First Way and Kalam require to be true is true in this hypothetical and yet the conclusion of those arguments is in different ways violated, primarily by suspending the assumption of uniformitarianism.

Astute readers may notice a parallel between this argument and Plantinga's Free Will Defense in that this is not attempting to prove an actuality, but rather a mere possibility, and it is the existence of that mere possibility that undermines other arguments -- The Deductive Problem of Evil for Plantinga and Aquinas and Kalam for me. As such, arguing that you don't believe that my hypothetical happened does you no good, you must show that my hypothetical is not possible or you have nothing. Get to work.

I will also point out that this is one of the problems with drawing conclusions from such arguments as Aquinas and Kalam is that all theories are necessarily underdetermined in that they all depend upon a host of auxiliary hypotheses which are not explicitly stated. If the auxiliary hypotheses do not hold, then the conclusion does not hold. In this case, I attacked uniformitarianism.