I will prove to you that God exists

[Belacqua]

Science, obviously, uses methodological materialism as its foundation, and that is just not the right approach for metaphysical questions. Science works really really well precisely because it doesn't attempt to answer metaphysical questions.

I had to Google "metaphysical questions."  Here is what I found:

"AI Overview
Metaphysics, a branch of philosophy, explores fundamental questions about reality, existence, and the nature of reality, often delving into concepts beyond the scope of empirical science. Here are some examples of metaphysical questions:
What is the nature of reality?
Does the world really exist?
What is the meaning of life?
Do we have free will?
What is consciousness?
Does God exist?
What is the nature of space and time?
What is the relationship between mind and matter?
What is the nature of identity?
What is the nature of change?
Why is there something rather than nothing?
Is there an objective morality?
What are the limits of knowledge?
How do symbolic systems (e.g., language) represent the world?"

The bolded questions are, I think, very definitely within the realm of science these days.
The italicized questions are debatably within the realm of science.
That doesn't leave many metaphysical questions which are beyond the limits of science.

It was good of you to take the time to look into metaphysics. As you said earlier, we all learn at different paces -- it's never too late. Certainly I have a long way to go yet. 

Naturally I disagree with which questions you've bolded and italicized, but those are all enormous questions and each one of them would require a whole lot of work if we wanted to look into it properly. 

Here is a good summary of the current state of metaphysics:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/

It may be that people here are conceiving of God as some sort of physical entity. Certainly this is far away from the God that Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Dante, Boehme, and Blake describe. Likewise more modern people, like Edward Feser, David Bentley Hart, Terry Eagleton, etc. God, for them, is intelligible, not sensible, and therefore not something that modern science can investigate. Looking for God with scientific methods is like looking for a prime number with a metal detector. 

I should add that "methodological materialism" is not where science started, but where it ended up because of what it found to be true.  Because of the assumed unified nature of truth, anything new we are trying to learn should be consistent with whatever we have already shown to be true.  That's why God is not immune from science, for instance.

As I understand it, science limits itself to methodological materialism because it ruled out dealing with the sorts of questions it can't answer. If you read about the methodology of Paracelsus, for example, he began as more of an alchemist, but turned toward practical, material methods simply because he wanted practical results. This doesn't mean that metaphysical aspects of the universe aren't real -- only that we have no practical way of using or manipulating them. Likewise Newton, though he was very open to alchemical explanations, was careful to limit his findings to material causes. He described what gravity does, and declined to say what it is. (Except in a tautological way -- gravity is the force which does the things that gravity does.) 

The change in investigative methods was largely a narrowing-down, to what could be shown through certain kinds of results. This was obvious already in the 17th century. In Molière's play Le Malade imaginaire, for example, he satirizes the medical profession through a scene where a character explains that opium induces sleep because of its "dormitive virtue." In other words, it causes sleep because it has the property of causing sleep. 

Modern science rests on a number of metaphysical assumptions, or guidelines. This book is still the best one on the subject:

https://www.amazon.com/Metaphysical-Foun...297&sr=8-3 

So anything we learn about the material world should be consistent with what we already know about the material world, but if we assume from this that only the material aspects of the world are real then we're simply begging the question.