“Normative” ethical theories

[Lucian]

Yeah no worries.  I mean, it may take longer than a day to figure out your own morality, too.  Been a log slog for me.  

Ha, more the effort of interacting with humans and trying to work out how to quote etc on an iphone. Brain tends to die quickly these days

Well, that's the fun thing about quasi realist expressivism and it's confluence with prgamatic ethics.  OFC you have genuinely held beliefs on moral desert, even if, intellectually, you think you are or suspect that you may be wrong on a fact-basis.  That those beliefs and opinions are not actually grounded in truth apt statements but may change or be changed for explicitly truth apt reasons, non truth apt reasons, or no reason at all.  Pragmatism in and of itself makes no comment on the nature of -those- beliefs, and you'll find a pragmatic theory of every variant..because regardless of the second order questions and their answers pragmatism is more about what to do with all of that, whatever or however it is, the first order bit.  Normativity.   Moral desert occupies the same space.  

I guess this comes down to how we view moral feelings and reactions and whether we would call those beliefs. Sure, I have retributivist tendencies and they are borne from my emotional reactions to things. I wouldn't call those beliefs though as they are non-propositional and are the basic emotional substrate of moral interactions. Morris and also de Waal cite Jonathan Haidt's work a lot to the effect that most moral positions are actually emotional in nature and rationality is kind of a justificatory veneer on top. Nice an consistent with an evolutionary view of morality where it doesn't track reality but is a quick and dirty prod to actions

Should people get more, exactly what, or less than they deserve?  Is it more or less praiseworthy (or more or less punishment worthy) for a good person to do a bad thing, a bad person to do a good thing, a good person to do a good thing, or a bad person to do a bad thing?  We needn't be hung up on what good or bad is, here - or whether the worthy-making property of each question is a moral one.  Perhaps things are more or less praise and punishment worthy depending on the outcomes of that act itself and not the instigating act in context of our societal goals.  

Let's take retribution as an example.  Over, exact, or less than?  Do we feel differently between different subjects?  Say a person thinks or feels, in general, people should get exactly what they deserve for good or for ill.  That this is how we should organize society and justice.  Maybe we think or feel that a given act deserves death in return because it caused a death.  Maybe we think or feel that even if an act didn't cause death then death is still on the table because the act is particularly detestable.  Or maybe we don't think or feel that explicitly but will accept it in the case of a particular subject.  Say.... a person who hurts kids.  Or maybe we think or feel that even if people kill people or hurt kids they still don't deserve to die and/or we should not then make ourselves killers on their account.

Outside of my emotional responses to those situations I would prefer to think in terms of what can be productive in how we treat those people. Sure, locking them away may make sense, and doing it for life may make sense but that doesn't have to be a "you are a horrible person, and part of the reason I am locking you away is that evaluation of you". That said, if someone did something to my nephew (I don't have kids) I am sure I would react in about as horrible a way as I can imagine to such a person. That doesn't mean I think it is right or justified to do so intellectually though.
I think where Morris makes a good case is that we can look at this from a policy perspective where moral argumentation doesn't always lead to the best solutions, but more utilitarian considerations can be preferable. Happy to delve into that route, but a lot there that is more than just a paragraph worth.

I am broadly speaking a necessitarian (Karofsky), and philosophical / neuro-science arguments against free-will bear some weight for me here.

What do you think?  Can you think of any edge cases to what you think..where as soon as you posit an opinion you realize that there are exceptions to what you -say- or -think- is an explicitly philosophic and thus truth-apt, even if not objectively truth-apt, system?

Can you help me understand what you mean here?