RE: “Normative” ethical theories
September 23, 2025 at 9:37 am
(This post was last modified: September 23, 2025 at 9:38 am by Lucian.)
As an example of why I am not convinced that moral realism of the naturalistic bent is just labelling an action bad (sorry if misrepresenting you)
Railton - “Naturalistic Realism in Metaethics” in the Routledge Handbook to Metaethics pg 44 “ On the other hand, ethical judgments appear to have a normative character or force that prosaically factual judgments do not-they prescribe or commend rather than merely describe. So it seems anomalous at best, and incoherent at worst, to assert in all sincerity that an action is morally wrong or unjust while being indifferent to whether it is performed…”
Railton - “Naturalistic Realism in Metaethics” in the Routledge Handbook to Metaethics pg 44 “ On the other hand, ethical judgments appear to have a normative character or force that prosaically factual judgments do not-they prescribe or commend rather than merely describe. So it seems anomalous at best, and incoherent at worst, to assert in all sincerity that an action is morally wrong or unjust while being indifferent to whether it is performed…”
