Hmmm. @The Grand Nudger I may have misread your penultimate post here to the effect that you would be making it likely your last reply as opposed to keeping it as your last reply (hence my lack of engagement in my response).
Still some fruitful grounds for discussing motivational internalism which you seem to reject (as would I) vs motivational externalism which I reject also, but wonder if you affirm?
Similarly the issue of what a normative property is.
Copp’s paper “Moral Naturalism and Three Grades of Normativity” certainly believes that we are ascribing a normative property of some sort to an action when we describe it in terms of morality.
“ Moral naturalism holds that in thinking of things as morally right or wrong, good or bad, we ascribe moral properties to these things – properties such as moral rightness and wrongness, goodness and evil. It holds that there are such properties, and it adds that these properties are ordinary garden-variety natural properties – properties that have the same basic metaphysical and epistemological status as the properties a tree can have of being deciduous, and the property a piece of paper can have of being an Australian twenty dollar bill. I will have more to say about this in what follows. The question is whether moral naturalism can accommodate the normativity of morality. This is basically the question whether it can account for the fact that morality is, in a characteristic way, action-guiding and choice-guiding. Moral thought and discourse concern how we are to act, what we are to choose, and how we are to live; they involve us in evaluating, prescribing, and recommending. I use the term “normative” to speak of this phenomenon”
I just bought his recent book “ethical naturalism and the problem of normativity” also which makes it clear that this is a central issue to describing something in moral terms
No worries if you are done with the thread though. We characteristically disagree with one another on metaethics, although hopefully in a friendly sort of way
Still some fruitful grounds for discussing motivational internalism which you seem to reject (as would I) vs motivational externalism which I reject also, but wonder if you affirm?
Similarly the issue of what a normative property is.
Copp’s paper “Moral Naturalism and Three Grades of Normativity” certainly believes that we are ascribing a normative property of some sort to an action when we describe it in terms of morality.
“ Moral naturalism holds that in thinking of things as morally right or wrong, good or bad, we ascribe moral properties to these things – properties such as moral rightness and wrongness, goodness and evil. It holds that there are such properties, and it adds that these properties are ordinary garden-variety natural properties – properties that have the same basic metaphysical and epistemological status as the properties a tree can have of being deciduous, and the property a piece of paper can have of being an Australian twenty dollar bill. I will have more to say about this in what follows. The question is whether moral naturalism can accommodate the normativity of morality. This is basically the question whether it can account for the fact that morality is, in a characteristic way, action-guiding and choice-guiding. Moral thought and discourse concern how we are to act, what we are to choose, and how we are to live; they involve us in evaluating, prescribing, and recommending. I use the term “normative” to speak of this phenomenon”
I just bought his recent book “ethical naturalism and the problem of normativity” also which makes it clear that this is a central issue to describing something in moral terms
No worries if you are done with the thread though. We characteristically disagree with one another on metaethics, although hopefully in a friendly sort of way
