Sure, they are motivational utterances, but that doesn’t get me to realism which is what I am rejecting. Do you think that there is any necessary motivational property inherent in an act being morally right or wrong, or our perception of an act as right or wrong? Or a weaker claim, that there is such for at least some moral claims or facts?
Sounds like you, me, and @Paraselene are all rejecting that for pretty much any moral or immoral act. If so, all good. We agree on something. The next question would be whether there is any kind of prescriptivist and how we ground that if we have come to an agreement on motivational properties
Sounds like you, me, and @Paraselene are all rejecting that for pretty much any moral or immoral act. If so, all good. We agree on something. The next question would be whether there is any kind of prescriptivist and how we ground that if we have come to an agreement on motivational properties
