@ fr0d0's 2 points above.
1. If our choices are really mechanical and not really choices then in what sense are we free to choose? In other words, how are you defining that?
To elaborate some here: It's important to note that the above question of mine isn't rhetorical. I believe we are free in the sense we have freedom, avoidability, capability, etc (which would also be true in a deterministic universe). Some of us are more free than others, slaves are less free that those who aren't slaves, obviously (for example). But I believe all our choices and decisions are entirely mechanized - because there is evidence for the mechanics of things and what evidence is there for more than this?
Now, I haven't really looked into either determinism or indeterminism much. As far as I know indeterminism is supported by Quantum Mechanics, so if I believe either I guess I'd have to say I'm an indeterminist if pushed.
But determinism is helpful to me to be used as an example, to help me to be clear that....any definition of free will that I would accept is also compatible with determinism. For I don't believe in any definition of 'free will' that can in anyway override the automated mechanics of the known universe. And any definition that I would accept, I wouldn't call 'free will'.
Why wouldn't I? Well because:
2. If our choices are all mechanical, how do we have specifically free will? Because we have a 'will' obviously in the sense we have intentions we have drive, preferences, likes, dislikes, ambition, etc...but how is this 'will', free exactly?
How is mechanized will, free will? Isn't mechanized will the opposite to free will? As I said: I know of no evidence that our choices are an exception to the mechanical. So in that sense, I don't see how they're free.
EvF
1. If our choices are really mechanical and not really choices then in what sense are we free to choose? In other words, how are you defining that?
To elaborate some here: It's important to note that the above question of mine isn't rhetorical. I believe we are free in the sense we have freedom, avoidability, capability, etc (which would also be true in a deterministic universe). Some of us are more free than others, slaves are less free that those who aren't slaves, obviously (for example). But I believe all our choices and decisions are entirely mechanized - because there is evidence for the mechanics of things and what evidence is there for more than this?
Now, I haven't really looked into either determinism or indeterminism much. As far as I know indeterminism is supported by Quantum Mechanics, so if I believe either I guess I'd have to say I'm an indeterminist if pushed.
But determinism is helpful to me to be used as an example, to help me to be clear that....any definition of free will that I would accept is also compatible with determinism. For I don't believe in any definition of 'free will' that can in anyway override the automated mechanics of the known universe. And any definition that I would accept, I wouldn't call 'free will'.
Why wouldn't I? Well because:
2. If our choices are all mechanical, how do we have specifically free will? Because we have a 'will' obviously in the sense we have intentions we have drive, preferences, likes, dislikes, ambition, etc...but how is this 'will', free exactly?
How is mechanized will, free will? Isn't mechanized will the opposite to free will? As I said: I know of no evidence that our choices are an exception to the mechanical. So in that sense, I don't see how they're free.
EvF
