(March 16, 2012 at 10:43 am)genkaus Wrote: Thus, any fundamental distinction between physics and metaphysics requires the assumption of more parts to reality than physical ones.
This may be a point of semantics more than real difference. Metaphysics would just be physics not yet developed. There must be only one reality and I've been calling the Totality. Maybe cosmos (kosmos) would be the more appropriate term. I've been calling physical reality the reality governed by physics to distinguish it from other forms of inquiry, like philosophy, mathematics, etc. Perhaps instead refering to "physical reality", I should refer to material reality, although I do not find that much of an improvement. (Suggestions?)
Plus I'm not convinced that everything reduces to physical processes as currently understood. I do not say that in order to defend theism. I still think there are serious problems in philosophy of mind that go beyond four fundamental forces and physical constants.
(March 16, 2012 at 10:43 am)genkaus Wrote: However, this assumption does not automatically make any part of reality dependent on another - nor does it indicate which part of reality is independent of which.
Would such a inter-dependency/coincidental be called nominalism in academic discourse?
(March 16, 2012 at 10:43 am)genkaus Wrote: Incorrect formulation. The correct one would be:
1. A fact is a true statement about a thing that will be true even when the thing goes unobserved.
2. “P” is a true statement about a thing “E”.
3. Thing “E” goes unobserved, therefore…
4. Statement “P” can be a fact (from 1).
You are correct. I misplace a negative. I'm still uncomfortable because this form uses the term "fact" for something that may never be observed. To me that's a bit of a problem. How then do you know if it is the true statement is really true? You could state a fact and not even know it to be true. To correct this problem, perhaps the following would be more accurate:
1. A fact is a statement about a thing that is observed to be true and which continues to be true even when the thing ceased to be observed.
2. "P" is a true statement about thing "E"
3. Thing "E" goes unobserved.
Therefore:
4. "P" cannot be a fact.
There is also a time element involved in the Premise 1 where it says "continues to be true". Because the fact can only be known be a true statement only during observation. A change could happen after the observation. Like if I say there is beer in the fridge but unbeknownst to me my "friend" drank it all.
This seems to strike at the heart of Idealism. Like you said, without facts there can be no proof. And without proof (in the form of observation) there can be no facts.
